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ABSTRACT 
We model technical innovation of a final good at the subcomponent 
level. Research and Development efforts are undertaken on 
subcomponents, incrementally enhancing the technological inputs to 
the final good. Through observation of actual R&D procurements, 
we identify the principal and agents appropriate for such innovation. 
Two categories of agent, the conventional profit seeking agent and a 
performance seeking agent, are identified. A principal who jointly 
values the capabilities of the subcomponent undergoing R&D and 
the funds available for purchasing other subcomponents to the final 
good is identified. The principal does not have a transferable utility 
function. We characterize optimal R&D production organization 
between such a principal and each type of agent. In addition to the 
importance of the information environment between principal and 
agent, the motivational properties of the principal and agent 
significantly affect the form and existence of optimal R&D 
procurement. We draw insights for both private and public sector 
industrial organization. 
v 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: The Role of R&D in Production Organization 
Chapter 2: The Pathology of Mars Observer Production Organization 
2.0 Description of the Mars Observer Mission 
2.1 Management Hierarchy: Definition of Players 
2.2 Initial Organization of Production 
2.3 Evolution of Subcomponent Development 
2.4 Production Outcome 
Chapter 3: Vertically Integrated Subcomponent Production 
3.0 Introduction to the Analytical Treatment 
3.1 The Simple Case of Vertical Integration 
Chapter 4: The Effects of Moral Hazard on R&D Procurements 
from a Profit Seeking Agent 
4 .0 Profit Seeking Agent within a Subcomponent R&D Model 
4.1 Relationship to Past Research 
4.2 One Stage R&D Subcomponent Production 
4.3 Standard Two Stage R&D Production 
4.4 Two Stage R&D Subcomponent Production 
4.5 The Relevance of the Observable 
4.6 Summary 
Chapter 5: The Effects of Moral Hazard on R&D Procurement 
from a Performance Seeking Agent 
5.0 Justification of Performance Seeking Agency 
5.1 Subcontracting under Full Information 
5.2 Subcontracting under Incomplete Information 
5.3 The Relevance of the Observable 
5.4 Summary 
Chapter 6: An Analytical Treatment of Mars Observer Production Organization 
6.0 Segue from Theory to Observation 
6.1 Characterization of the Original Bilateral Monopoly Contracts 
6.2 Impacts of Different Experiment Agent Types 
6.3 The Lack of Observables in Experiment Subcomponent Production 
6.4 The Potential Lack of Enforcement in Experiment 
Subcomponent Production 
6.5 Renegotiation as a Response to Agency Problems 




































Chapter 7: Examples of Various R&D Production Organizations 81 
7.0 The Cassini Resource Management Plan 81 
7.1 The Procurement of Booster Engines for Commercial Satellite Services 82 
7.2 Procurement of the Mars Environmental Survey: A Suggested Approach 85 
Chapter 8: The Placement of R&D Procurement in Production Organization 92 
References 96 
Vll 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Mars Observer Spacecraft and Experiments 4 
2.2: Authority Hierarchy for the Mars Observer Mission 5 
2.3: Mars Observer Price Estimate History 15 
2.4: Subcomponent Initial Estimated Prices vs Final Prices 20 
3.1: Decision Flow for Vertically Integrated Production 24 
3.2: Principal's Utility Space with Sample Indifference Curves, Production 
Possibilities Frontiers, Research and Development Funding 27 
4.1: Decision Flow if Contracting with a Profit Seeking Agent 29 
4.2: Potential ICDR Analogs of Several Actual R&D Contract Forms 31 
4.3: Case A: Partial Margin Contract, Principal Bias 39 
4.4: Case B: Fixed Price/Performance Award, No Bias 39 
4.5: Case C: Fixed Price/Performance Award, Agent Bias 39 
4.6: Case D: Partial Margin Contract, Agent Bias 39 
4.7: Profit Seeking Agent without an Observable Research Outcome 47 
5.1: Decision Flow if Contracting with a Performance Seeking Agent 49 
5.2: Interested Agent without an Observable Research Outcome 61 
6.1: Initial Spacecraft Contract 68 
6.2: Initial Experiment Contracts 68 
6.3: New Altimetry Contract 73 
7.1: Pre-Challenger Procurement of Satellite Services 82 
7.2: Post-Challenger Procurement of Satellite Services 83 
7.3: Booster Engine R&D Contract 84 
7.4: Suggested Production Organization for MESUR 86 
7.5: Craft Auction Matrix 88 
7.6: Effect of Actual Envelope on Final Price 88 
7.7: MESUR Craft Contract 88 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Initial Organization of Subcomponents and Agents 8 
6.1: Contract Renegotiation 71 
6.2: Actual Contracts that may Correspond to 
Optimal ICDR R&D Contracts 79 
7.1: Craft Agency Concerns and Solutions 87 
1 
Chapter 1: The Role of R&D in Production Organization 
Understanding the production organization of a fmal good assembled from 
numerous subcomponents is of obvious significance. Though an assembly line comes to 
mind, the image is of little relevance, for an assembly line is the process through which 
already produced subcomponents are combined in a routine and monitorable manner. 
The true question of interest in production organization is how subcomponent production 
is organized. Three examples are evocative: 
Most major automobile manufactures produce their own engines whereas 
not a single airplane manufacturer produces jet engines. 
Many automobile companies produce the suspension subcomponent for 
their entrants in the sports car market yet purchase the suspension system 
design from Lotus of England. 
Producers of fmished food products purchase NutraSweet from the 
corporation that holds the patent whereas Mashushita produces its own 
compact disc systems via a license purchased from Sony and Phillips. 
These examples involve technological innovation in the subcomponents that 
constitute the final good. The fundamental effect of technological progress on production 
is obvious and well accepted. What are not obvious are the reasons behind the myriad 
organizational structures between innovator and final producer that we observe. 
Subcomponents may be innovated and produced under the management of the final good 
producer, innovated by one entity and produced by the final good producer, or innovated 
and produced by one entity and transferred to the final good producer. The organization 
of subcomponent innovation, hereafter referred to as Research and Development (R&D), 
is critical to production organization, yet the forms chosen for R&D organization are not 
adequately explained by either the existing Industrial Organization or Optimal Contacting 
literatures. In this thesis we attempt an adequate treatment of R&D subcomponent 
production organization. A quick review of established theory motivates our approach. 
Coase's observation that production is vertically integrated to the degree that the 
marginal cost of so doing is below that of market contracting provides a unifying 
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paradigm yet so borders on tautology that little can be specifically explained.1 Alchain's 
and Demsetz' corollary that production is vertically integrated until the cost of 
management forces the marginal cost of internal production to exceed that of market 
procurement adds little except to suggest that production efficiency within a firm is 
degraded when subordinates can conceal their inputs to production, thus extracting a rent 
from management. 2 When subordinates behave this way it is referred to as moral 
hazard. Williamson expands on Alchain's, Crawford's, and Klein's observation of the 
significance of bilateral monopoly in complex subcomponent production by illustrating 
the effects of moral hazard in both internally organized and market contracted 
production. 3,4 Past analytical research has concentrated on principal/agent models of 
single component production with no work expressly considering the effects of 
subcomponent production. 5 
A more useful characterization of the motivating reasons for production 
organizations can be attained by analyzing subcomponent production-- emphasizing the 
organizational significance of the goals of the final good producer and the goals of 
subcomponent producers. In this thesis we examine subcomponent procurements that 
require research and development (R&D), a process particularly prone to the influence of 
moral hazard due to the probabilistic nature inherent in innovation. The effects of the 
type of final product, the interests of the principal, and the interests of the potential agents 
are considered in characterizing optimal organizational arrangements (contracts). 
1 Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, New Series, vol. 4, 1937. 
2 Armen A. Alchain, Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," 
The American Economic Review, vol. 62, no. 5, 1972. 
3Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchain, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1978, 
page 299. 
40liver E. Williamson, "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations," The 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, no. 2, 1979. 
5The works of Laffont, Tirole, Holmstrom, and others represent analytical trea~ents of simple optimal 
contracting in the presence of moral hazard. The classic moral hazard optimal contracting literature is 
examined in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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One of the primary goals of this research is to provide practical insight into why 
and how production, particularly innovation, should be organized; thus, it is natural that 
case studies be examined for both guidance and credibility. Rather than cataloging the 
characteristics of existing production organizations under the assumption that 'to be is to 
be optimal', we attempt to uncover the principal/agent genesis of production 
organizations by examining the pathology of a production organization that was rendered 
non-optimal due to poor acknowledgment of moral hazard. Production of the Mars 
Observer planetary mission (launched in September of 1992) required the organization of 
an array of agent interests within a multiple component R&D production process.6 
Studying the evolution of the subcomponent contracts for Mars Observer reveals a non-
optimal production organization that illuminates the importance of moral hazard, and, 
thus, the relevance of principal/agent concerns in R&D production organization. 
The thesis is organized as follows: We first study the physical nature of the Mars 
Observer production process, the motivational differences between the principal and the 
different agents, and the historical evolution of subcomponent production organization. 
We proceed through a structured, analytical modeling of the types of production 
organization highlighted in the Mars Observer experience with the intent to characterize 
-general optimal contracting arrangements. Using this analytical structure the Mars 
Observer experience is assessed, highlighting the ramifications of contracting without 
regard for moral hazard. Thereafter, general principles of optimal R&D subcomponent 
production organization are applied to several examples of existing and potential final 
good production. The thesis concludes with a perspective that supports an understanding 
of why production in a complex economy is organized as it is and how certain production 
might be better organized. 
6Tbe same can be said of all 'Big Science' Projects. 
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Chapter 2: The Pathology of Mars Observer Production Organization 
2.0 Description of the Mars Observer Mission 
The two Viking missions to Mars in the mid- to late 1970's were designed to 
conduct detailed measurements at two points on the Martian surface, with orbital imaging 
employed primarily to assess potential landing sites. The results of the orbital imaging 
and the scientific information from the two landing sites raised substantial questions 
about the geologic and climatologic natures of Mars on a global scale. These questions 
led to the Mars Observer mission which was authorized by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in October 1983 (later by the U.S. Congress) and delegated to the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 
The intended final good from the Mars Observer mission is new information 
about Mars. To produce this final good, a number of subcomponents have to be 
produced, assembled, and operated: experiments (conducted using various instruments) 
and experiment support systems (transport, power, communications, etc ... ). Selection of 
the experiment and support system producers occurred in April 1986 with substantial 
funding beginning in mid-1986. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the Mars Observer spacecraft and experiments as launched 
on September 25, 1992. The price of the mission has been recorded at approximately 
$530 million ( 1992$) over the period from October 1983 to October 1992. The original 
Figure 2.1: Mars Observer Spacecraft and Experiments 
Magnetometry 
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budget for the mission was approximately $250 million (1992$). The experiments shown 
are less ambitious than those that were selected in 1986. When launched, the spacecraft 
was capable of transporting more mass and supplying more power than was required even 
though several of the experiment subcomponents had made mass and/or power reductions 
that resulted in decreased capabilities and/or cost increases. This physical resource 
surplus indicates a production organization that was ex post sub-optimal, a conclusion 
heightened by the substantial price overrun for the mission. 
2.1 Manaeement Hierarchy: Definition of Players 
Production of the Mars Observer mission was organized within a hierarchy 
leading from the funding source to the producers of the various subcomponents as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Between Congress and the Subcomponent Agents rests NASA, 
the agency of the Executive authorized to conduct the mission, and the Mars Observer 
Figure 2.2: Authority Hierarchy for the Mars Observer Mission 
JPL 
Division 













Private I ~ Subcomponent 
Firm Agents 
L...------' 
Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), the agent selected by NASA to 
organize mission production. The Project Office acts as a primary source of advice to 
NASA when critical subcontractors are selected and is responsible for negotiating and 
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implementing all subcomponent contracts. Given this status, the Project Office can be 
thought of as the Managing Principal, a type of intermediate agent to whom is delegated 
the responsibility of pursuing the wishes of the Ultimate Principal. The standard 
information asymmetry, which creates an environment for moral hazard, pertains; 
namely, each Subcomponent Agent has clearer information about the production status of 
their subcomponent than does the Managing Principal. 
Figure 2.2 indicates four general types of agent for the various subcomponents. 
These agent types are most tellingly distinguished by their differing interests relative to 
participation on the mission: 
A JPL Divisional or NASA Center Agent can be motivated by the 
performance of their subcomponent; however, institutional interests 
commensurate with maintaining or advancing their position within their 
parent organization may cause such an agent to value funding 
independently. For example, the wish to maintain or win some other 
contract may encourage the reallocation of funds, quality labor, or physical 
resources away from the particular subcomponent. 7 
Inclusion as an experiment subcontractor can fundamentally affect the career 
of a planetary scientist; thus, a Scientist Agent can be thought of as 
primarily motivated by the performance of his experiment. 8 This will put 
him in partial agreement with the Project Office which values some 
balanced measure of performance from all of the experiments.9 
Ignoring any repeated game effects, the Private Firm Agent will be a profit 
seeker.10 He has no fundamental concern with the performance of his 
subcomponent and wishes to charge as much as possible for whatever work 
he does or can claim to have done. 
?The standard organizational arrangement between a NASA-funded Project Office and a NASA Center 
or JPL Divisional agent legally forbids the agent from directly profiting from the arrangement. However, 
such an agent has numerous non-performance uses of funding including: the number of assigned 
employees, office equipment, and labor/capital allocations among a project portfolio. 
8 Planetary Science missions to any one destination are infrequent and, from a career standpoint, not 
easily foreseen. A scientist agent for an experiment may shape the type, quality, and dissemination of the 
data from his experiment Further, he is often granted a one year monopoly right to data from the moment 
it is received. Thus, presence as an experiment agent has a fundamental career-long worth to a scientist. 
9Graft is still a possibility; however, the assumption is that a scientist's long-term carrier motivation to 
lead his field through a successful outcome from his experiment will dominate short-term motivations to 
commit graft. The prohibition on profit is accompanied by a prohibition on loss - the scientist may not be 
compelled to absorb any production costs even if his subcomponent fails to operate. 
lOUniike planetary scientists for whom planetary missions represent almost all demand for their wares, 
private aerospace subcontractors have many other markets; therefore, any rationale that a reputation effect 
will throttle moral hazard profiteering by a private firm agent is suspect as the NASA 'market' and the 
standard aerospace market may be too dissimilar for a 'bad' NASA reputation to have any binding effect .. 
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It will be assumed that the interests of the ultimate principal, Congress, can be 
fully characterized by two related qualities of the mission: the price paid (funds 
appropriated) and the performance attained. II It will further be assumed that the 
'contract' between the Congress and the Project Office (through NASA) appropriately 
rewards or punishes the Project Office for managing the mission with respect to the 
interests of the Congress.12 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Project Office will 
organize the production of mission components to maximize the price/performance 
outcome relative to congressional values, with appropriate compensation to the Project 
Office. From this perspective the differences between the interests of the Project Office 
and the Agents can be highlighted: 
A JPL Divisional or NASA Center Agent, by valuing the performance 
from its experiment, will value a subset of the overall performance 
measures valued by the Project Office. Partial agreement implies partial 
disagreement; thus, unbridled pursuit by the agent to enhance the 
performance of its experiment may un-balance the overall measure of 
performance valued by the Project Office. Further moral hazard is present 
because of this agent's independent valuation of other uses of funding 
which is in direct opposition to the Project Office's interest in maximizing 
a balance of performance and mission price. 
A Scientist Agent, by valuing the performance from its experiment, may 
pursue funding in a manner at odds with the overall performance interests 
of the Project Office. Also, any valued use of funds other than experiment 
R&D may put this agent at odds with the interests of the Project Office. 
In a wholly conventional and obvious fashion, the interests of the Private 
Firm Agent are completely opposed to the interests of the Project Office. 
Several clarifications should be placed on agent status that provide insight into the 
many tiered complexity of this R&D production process and a clearer justification for 
considering the Scientist Agent to be a distinct type from the JPL Divisional and NASA 
Center Agents. An agent for a particular subcomponent will most likely have 
11 Performance will be considered as some measurable increase in the body of scientific knowledge 
about the target of the mission. As this scientific knowledge is multi-disciplinary, 'balanced' increases are 
assumed to be preferred to increases skewed toward one discipline. An indication of a preference for 
'balanced' science return from a mission can be inferred from the experiments selected. 
12This assumption simplifies the examination of the organizational relationships between the sub-
contractors and the managing principal; however, the assumption is strong and arguable. 
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subcontractors of its own. Further, one of these lower level subcontractors can be a 
member of one of the four general agent types. For example, a NASA Center may be 
under contract to the Project Office to produce the instrumentation for a particular 
experiment for which the Center subcontracts to a chief scientist and several private 
firms. In an additional complication, two of the possible agent types are subdivisions of 
organizations that 'out rank' the Project Office; i.e., a JPL Division is a pre-existing 
subsection of JPL and a NASA Center is a constituent part of NASA with equal overall 
hierarchical position to JPL. Thus, the actual authority wielded by the Project Office over 
agents of these two general types is questionable. Strong institutional interests at NASA 
or JPL might work to countermand Project Office directions. The potential ramifications 
of 'out ranking' the Managing Principal requires distinguishing the Scientist Agent from 
the JPL Divisional or NASA Center Agent. 
The initial organization of subcomponents and agents for Mars Observer is 
provided in Table 2.1. It should be noted that the vast majority of the subcomponents of 
the mission were subcontracted; almost none of the actual design and production was to 
be directly supervised by the Project Office. 
Table 2.1: Intitial Organization of Subcomponents and Agents 
Subcomponent Agent Agent Type 
Spacecraft Astro Space Division of RCA, later aquired Private Finn 
by General Electric 
Altimetry Goddard Space Flight Center NASA Center 
Atmospheric JPL Technical Divisions JPL Division 
Sounding 
Physical Composition: JPL Technical Divisions JPL Division Mapping Spectrometry 
Physical Composition: 
Gamma Ray Spec. 
Goddard Space Flight Center NASA Center 
Physical Composition: Arizona State University, Dr. Christensen Scientist 
Thermal Emission Spec. 
Imaging Arizona State University, Dr. Malin ·Scientist 
Magneto me try Goddard Space Flight Center NASA Center 
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2.2 Initial Organization of Production 
Initially, the Spacecraft contract was comprised of two distinct and sequential 
payment streams: a pre-determined series of payments leading up to launch, followed by 
a stream of contingent payments that would be transferred to the contractor over the life 
of the mission if the spacecraft performed properly. This type of contract was designated 
as a Fixed Price Performance Award contract. By using a fixed price contract for a set of 
pre-defined performance requirements the spacecraft agent was to have no opportunity to 
seek additional funding from the Project Office for any actual or claimed 'unlucky' 
occurrences. Such actions by the spacecraft agent were to have been eliminated by, in 
effect, agreeing to a subcomponent price sufficiently high to allow the agent to 
comfortably self-insure against 'unlucky' outcomes while providing no incentive to 
misrepresent progress. 
All experiment subcontracts were to be margin contacts, a contract that explicitly 
recognized the unknown tradeoffs between performance and price at the start of an R&D 
process: An experiment agent was provided with an initial funding allocation to start 
R&D production. Subsequent funding allocations were provided in accordance with the 
price/performance tradeoffs for the technologies that emerged from the early stages of 
R&D production. A margin pool was to be held by the Project Office from which these 
subsequent allocations would be made. 
The policy of margin management was standard practice and was considered 
analogous to an insurance pool guarding against the incidence of 'bad luck' attendant to 
R&D in state-of-the-art instrument production. To a point, the more 'unlucky' the initial 
research efforts, the greater the subsequent margin funding. Moral hazard was to be 
guarded against by monitoring the purported 'bad luck' necessitating the margin 
allocation request. Standard margin policy does not set firm rules regarding the extent to 
which any agent may draw from the margin pool relative to the expressed needs of other 
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agents. Margin allocations would be decided in real-time by the Project Office and 
would not be subject to any prior agreements. 
Obviously, all of the experiments, once the instruments are built, are integrated 
with the spacecraft and propelled to Mars. Consequently, the mass, power usage, and 
volume that the instruments require from the spacecraft represent resources which must 
be produced in concert with the experiments if the assembled mission is to result in the 
final good desired; namely, science return from Mars. As with funding, all physical 
experiment resources were organized with contracts featuring centrally held margin pools 
and standard margin management. 
When an experiment receives changes in physical resource margin allocations, the 
contracted configuration of the spacecraft must often change. This is most obvious when 
mass margin allocations affect the center of mass for the assembled mission, requiring the 
addition of counter-balancing 'dead weight' and/or the repositioning of numerous 
components. Contractually, such a change is the fault of the Project Office; thus, the 
spacecraft contract must be reopened and the spacecraft contractor must be compensated 
for the change. Through this dynamic, the Fixed Price Performance Fee contract, and its 
laudable qualities countering agency concerns, can be rendered void. The contract can 
effectively become a cost-reimbursable contract with price increases driven by 
experiment margin allocations and moral hazard profiteering by the spacecraft agent. 
This possibility did not go un-noted by the Project Office. At the earliest stage of 
Mars Observer production organization design, an instrument module, produced by JPL, 
was to provide the physical interface between the experiments and the spacecraft. The 
total of all physical resources used by the instrument module and all instruments 
integrated on it was to be fixed with the Project Office allocating resource margins 
defined within this fixed total. In this manner, the spacecraft contractor would see a 
credibly fixed interface and know he was truly subject to a fixed price contract. But, the 
JPL Project Office was concerned over the funding and physical resources that an 
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instrument module would require at the expense of other mission subcomponents. This 
concern resulted in the deletion of the module from the mission.13 The recognition that 
this might cause incentive problems is apparent from the following view expressed by the 
Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects during the period when module deletion 
was being discussed: 
"This is a sticky wicket. Somehow we have to maintain the concept of a module thru the 
Bus (Spacecraft) selection process .... The main worry I have in abandoning the idea of 
the payload module is that we might lose some element of control over the experimenters' 
appetites (for funds, mass, power, etc .. ) which the spacecraft contractor would be only too 
happy to satisfy- and submit the bill later." 14 
Still, the instrument module was deleted, with no compensating changes made to 
any other parts of the production organization design. 
The spacecraft contract allowed Project Office changes via a mechanism called 
the unilateral modification- the Project Office unilaterally directs the contractor to make 
a change to the contracted effort. The unilateral modification mechanism contains a 'time 
is of the essence' clause which allows the Project Office to authorize the contractor to 
begin work on the modification before the two parties have agreed on a price for the 
modification. At the time that proposals were requested from potential subcontractors, 
the module had been deleted and the planned contracting organizations, including the 
unilateral modification mechanism, were public knowledge. Thus, bidders for the 
spacecraft contract could easily assume that the experiment margin management policy 
would result in substantial unilateral modifications to the spacecraft contract, with the 
selected contractor in a monopoly position at the time of price re-negotiation. Substantial 
extra profit potential therefore existed because of the non-fixed nature of the Fixed Price 
Performance Fee contract. An additional ramification of the unilateral modification 
mechanism is that since all potential spacecraft contractors knew that, if selected, they 
13MGCO Project Management Report, March 23, 1984. 
14W . Giberson (JPL ALD), Handwritten note on a copy of JPL Interoffice Memorandum of W. Purdy, 
re: 3/14/84 RFP Meeting with Code EL, March 9, 1984. 
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were unlikely to have to deliver the bid spacecraft at the bid price, there is little reason to 
believe that the bid prices represented reliable cost or comparative advantage information. 
With the exception of Magnetometry, all of the experiments were to use 
instruments that represented state-of-the-art designs This was reasonable because the 
state-of-the-art for Mars instruments was defmed by the early 1970's technology used on 
the Viking missions. Commensurate with the developmental status of their instruments, 
most of the agents requested funding for some form of prototyping; from concept-testing 
breadboarding to full engineering models. IS 
The Mars Observer Mission had been 'sold' to the Office of Management and 
Budget and then later to the Congress as a more cost effective way of undertaking 
planetary exploration featuring the use of existing "off-the-shelf' technologies, private 
industry, rapid production, and a price tag of $250 million (1992$). When the 
subcomponent contracts were signed (most by late 1986) the Project Office was under 
intense pressure from NASA to constrain the estimated total cost of the mission to $250 
million (1992$). Thus, all tasks not specifically related to production of flight hardware 
were disallowed.16 By disallowing all prototyping, monitorable indicators of progress on 
the various experiment R&D efforts were consciously discarded by the Project Office. 
On November 13, 1986 the Project Office recommended to NASA that contracts 
be initiated with all of the experiment agents at levels of funding that, when added to the 
spacecraft fixed price, totaled less than $250 million (1992$). However, the Project 
Office also recommended that NASA and the Congress provide additional funds to cover 
15Tbat such requests had to be made is suggestive of the type of contractual relationship between the 
Project Office and the instrument agents -- detailed production plans had to be submitted with all aspects 
subject to Project Office approval. Thus, when the Camera (Imaging) agent reported that through the use of 
a lighter and stronger casing material he could increase the camera primary mirror from 25 em to 35 em, 
substantially increasing performance without increasing total mass or cost, he had to request permission to 
do so. [Mars Observer Project Management Report, June 26, 1986.] 
16Mars Observer Project Science Group Meeting Minutes, First Meeting, F . Palluconi, and Section L, 
April23 and 25, 1986. 
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the developmental nature of the instruments.17 This was a clear admission by the Project 
Office that the subcontracted prices were not credible. 
The potential implications of the margin management structure employed to 
organize Mars Observer experiment production are straightforward. Because of moral 
hazard, incidences of bad luck will be reported as the basis for a margin allocation request 
if the agent judges the current environment (size of margin pool, disposition of Project 
Office, etc .... ) to be conducive to maintaining experiment status. Incidences of good luck 
will go unreported if the agent feels that a reverse margin policy would commandeer his 
good fortune to compensate for someone else's purported misfortune. Thus, resource 
savings from good luck will be (i) retained by the agent as insurance against future bad 
luck, (ii) used to increase performance (by a performance motivated agent), or (iii) 
transformed into monetary savings and pocketed (by a funding motivated agent). 
Knowing that his estimates need not be credible and that he will probably be at least 
partially compensated in the future with margin allocations, an experiment agent can 
willingly submit or agree to 'optimistic' initial estimates. Further, the agent is relieved of 
the need to manage its production organization in as rigorous a manner as if its resource 
estimates were somehow binding. Cost increases over initial cost estimates were 
inevitable. 
The experiment and spacecraft agents were selected in the period immediately 
after the Challenger disaster; NASA funding was being restructured and launch dates and 
conditions for future missions were undergoing substantial re-planning. In the pre-
Challenger plan, Mars Observer was to be launched in August 1990; however, by August 
1986 the decision had been made to postpone the launch until September 1992. For 
reasons beyond the purview of this thesis, the Project Office had to publicly claim that 
Mars Observer was being actively organized for a 1990 launch while at the same time it 
11Mars Observer Project Management Repon, November 20, 1986. 
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had to manage the project in accordance with a 19921aunch.18 On Apri114, 1987 the 
postponement to 1992 was officially ordered. By this date, contracts with all 
subcomponent agents had been initiated along the lines described above. 
Based on the additional two year wait for information return and using the 
consequences of the Challenger disaster for fiscal cover, a six month effort to redefine 
Mars Observer for 1992 commenced in May of 1987. Risk of failure was to be lessened 
by increasing redundancy where ever practical. All experiment instrument designs were 
re-evaluated to enhance the science return from the mission. The spacecraft contractor 
was asked, via the unilateral modification process, to redesign and accommodate all of 
the enhancements as they were approved. 
At this point, approximately 5% of all eventual funds had been allocated toward 
the subcontracts, no actual hardware had been produced or tested, and most designs were 
incomplete. Although the specific subcomponents had yet to be agreed upon, the 
participants had been contracted with and the basic structure of the contracts did not 
change. The situation can be seen as a collection of bilateral monopolies with the Project 
Office as a monopsonist party to a set of monopolist suppliers. The appropriate 
description of the initial organization of Mars Observer production is: 
Mars Observer production was initially organized as a set of bilateral 
monopolies governed by one very un-fixed, fixed price contract and a set 
of cost-reimbursable contracts that were to be implemented under the 
margin management process. 
2.3 Evolution of Subcomponent Development 
After the launch delay was official, the reported estimated costs escalated quickly 
and dramatically as shown in Figure 2.3. By November of 1987, estimated costs were so 
18Charles Polk, Mars Observer Project History, JPL D-8095 (internal document), December 1990. 
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great that NASA refused to support the project as organized and issued Critical Decision 
Issue (CDI) #501, requesting information from the Project Office on ways to reorganize 
(re-contract) the mission to reduce the estimated cost. This led to the mission descope 
decision of September 1988 in which the mapping spectrometry experiment was deleted 
from the mission and the instrument for conducting the altimetry experiment was 
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The September 1988 re-contracting was the first of several changes made to the 
bilateral monopoly contracts over the next four years, mostly characterized by changes in 
the agents contracted to manage the subcomponents. Figure 2.3 indicates the timing and 
identity of these re-contracting steps: Substantial experiment re-contracting occurred in 
distinct steps while spacecraft re-contracting occurred incrementally over many unilateral 
modifications. The remainder of this section will briefly describe the changes in agents, 
motivations, and production organizations (contracts) that accompanied the re-contracting 
actions indicated in Figure 2.3. 
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Spacecraft Re-Contracting 
The spacecraft contract was modified from 1988 through 1992 by a series of 
unilateral modifications issued to accommodate the growing resource demands of the 
instruments and the growing demands of the Project Office to enhance expected 
performance. As a rule, the charged price of later modifications exceeded the prices that 
the Project Office initially expected based on earlier modifications.19 Increasing 
expenditure combined with concern over expected performance (quality) led the Project 
Office to increase JPL on-site monitoring of the spacecraft contractor and to impose JPL 
production practices on the contractor.20 All designs, production processes, and 
inspection specifications had to be reviewed and approved by the Project Office. Hence, 
spacecraft production management was partially internalized by the Project Office. 
Rather than subcontract for a spacecraft, the Project Office arranged to 'Rent a Firm' to 
produce a spacecraft. 
Altimetry Re-Contracting 
The altimetry subcomponent to science information was initially to be 
implemented with a radar altimeter. The radar altimeter was eliminated and replaced by a 
laser altimeter as part of the 1988 re-contracting response to NASA CDI #501. Like the 
radar altimeter, production of the laser altimeter was managed by NASA's Goddard Space 
Flight Center. However, the individuals directing the production were different and the 
contract with the Project Office was fundamentally different -- the laser altimeter would 
not be produced under a margin management, cost-plus contract. Rather, $11 million 
(1992 $)was allocated within which the altimeter team was free to make all performance, 
19-rbe hardening of the spacecraft contractor's bargaining position as the project progressed is hardly 
surprising. The nearer to completion, the more expensive it would be to replace the spacecraft contractor 
with another contractor. Perhaps more significant, the nearer to completion, the more money Congress had 
'sunk' into the mission and the less credible is any threat by the Project Office to delay, suspend or 
terminate the contract 
20At no point was an increase in post-launch performance incentive payments implemented rather than 
these increases in monitoring and intrusion. [see Chapter 6 for a discussion of the ramifications of this] 
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cost, schedule, and quality tradeoffs that it felt necessary. Only three restrictions were 
placed on the development effort: 
• Interface requirements with the spacecraft must be met. 
• If it appeared that the $11 million allocation would be exceeded, 
production of the laser altimeter would be terminated. 
• If it appeared that performance would drop below some minimum level, 
production of the laser altimeter would be terminated. 
Additionally, the individuals responsible for the laser altimeter knew that success would 
save Goddard's position relative to the science output of the mission; thus, career 
enhancing performance, though contractually a residual to price, figured in the motivation 
of the new altimetry subcomponent agent. 
Atmospheric Sounding Re-Contracting 
Within one year of the 1988 mission descoping, the Project Office was so 
seriously concerned about the magnitude of eventual margin requests by the JPL 
Divisional Agent responsible for the atmospheric sounding experiment that it considered 
downgrading the performance of the experiment.21 Nevertheless, repeated discussions 
between the Project Office, the Divisional Agent, and upper JPL management resulted in 
the continuance of the initial contractual relationships. 22 Margin allocations mounted 
until the atmospheric sounding experiment was consuming the vast majority of the 
margin pool. Even at this point, approved margin funding was far less than the requests 
made by the JPL Divisional Agent In May of 1991, the initial subcontract was 
terminated and direct production management was internalized with the Project Office. 
Production was suspended so that existing funds could be reallocated to the other 
instruments while additional funding was solicited from NASA for the atmospheric 
21Mars Observer Project Management Repon, July 28, 1989, page 3Ca. 
22JPL Interoffice Memorandum from David Evans, Mars Observer Project Manager to Kane Casani, 
JPL Division Manager responsible for the Atmospheric Sounder, March 20, 1990; and JPL Interoffice 
Memorandum from David Evans and Kane Casani to John Casani, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight 
Projects, June 11, 1990. 
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sounder.23 Once additional funding was in place, the Project Office directed a 'catch-up' 
production path resulting in the late arrival of the instrument for integration on the 
spacecraft. 24 
Gamma Ray Spectrometry Re-Contracting 
According to at least one analysis, the gamma ray spectrometry experiment barely 
escaped elimination in the 1988 mission descoping.25 Funding and physical resource 
margin requests by the Goddard agent became an increasingly serious problem. The 
Project Office considered the agent to be unresponsive to requests for information, 
direction, or concerns over the course of subcomponent production. The Project Office 
strongly requested and eventually received a restructuring of the effort within Goddard 
with the responsible agent being replaced and the efforts being reassigned to another 
section of Goddard. 26 
Imaging Re-Contracting 
The imaging experiment was initially contracted to a scientist agent who was a 
faculty member at an American university. This is the standard arrangement when the 
subcomponent agent is a scientist. In this arrangement, part of the funding allocated to 
the agent is absorbed by the sponsoring university for staff benefits, facility use, etc. In 
this instance, the scientist agent became disaffec~ with the level of support that his 
university was willing to supply.27 Believing this support to be inadequate, the agent 
23Mars Observer Budget Status Report, presented to Dr. W. Huntress, March 6, 1991, GEC-35, 36; 
and Mars Observer FY91 3rd Quarterly Review, May 16, 1991, GLR-4. 
24Late arrival for integration violated the spacecraft contract and required, of course, that a unilateral 
modification be issued by the Project Office to cover the costs of late integration. 
25see Charles Polk, 1990. 
26official JPL letter from John Casani, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects to Dr. James 
H. Trainer, Associate Director, NASA/Goddard, November 17, 1989; Mars Observer Project Management 
Report, October 26, 1989, page 3Ca; Mars Observer FY90 1st Quarterly Review, December 5, 1989, page 
DDE-9; Mars Observer Project Management Report, December 2 1, 1989, page 2Alb. 
27official JPL letter from David Evans, Mars Observer Project Manager to Marius B. Weintreb, 
NASA Program Manger for Mars Observer, July 5, 1990. 
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internalized the support functions normally subcontracted to the sponsoring university by 
terminating his position with the university, forming his own corporation, and managing 
the support functions through this corporation.28 This was possible as the 'property right' 
to the experiment contract with the Project Office was vested with the contracted scientist 
agent and not with his university. During and after this bit of agent inspired re-
contracting, NASA dictated the allocation of substantial additional funds to the imaging 
experiment due to renewed emphasis on Mars exploration and the attendant interest in 
imaging products. Thus, re-contracting was also directed from above. The imaging 
instrument none-the-less required substantial margin allocations; however, neither the 
subcontracted agent nor the contract form were altered. 
Commentary 
Of the major subcomponents, fundamental re-contracting was carried out for six of 
the eight. Such re-contracting was characterized by a change of agent, a change of 
contract form, or the outright elimination of the subcomponent. Among the science 
gathering subcomponents, only the thermal emission spectrometry experiment and the 
re-contractin . 
2.4 Production Outcome 
Given that the final product being purchased is scientific information about Mars, 
the actual outcome of production does not yet exist as of today. However, all of the 
physical hardware intended to supply the subcomponents for this scientific information 
have been assembled and sent on their way to Mars. Thus, the production process 
through final assembly can be analyzed as a proxy for final product analysis if we assume 
that the hardware will perform as advertised. 
Figure 2.4 compares the reported estimated cost of each of the subcomponent 
contracts, when the conditions of bilateral monopoly were initiated, with the final 
28E-mail message from Dr. Michael C. Malin, Principal Investigator of the Mars Observer Camera to 
Thomas E. Thorpe, Mars Observer Project Science Manager, June 15, 1990. 
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subcomponent prices paid by the Project Office. 29 For the experiments, the differences in 
these figures provide a broad indication of the total margin allocations transferred from 
the Project Office. Further, much of the difference between initial and final spacecraft 
prices is attributable to the incremental, experiment driven unilateral modifications to the 
spacecraft contract -- this too is an allocation of margins to the experiment by the Project 
Office. One caveat should be stated-- physical resource margin increases (e.g., mass) for 
different experiments affected the spacecraft design differently. Therefore the portion of 
the spacecraft price increases attributable to experiment margin allocations cannot be 
apportioned among the experiments directly by their margin allocations.30 Spacecraft 
unilateral modifications were often issued by the Project Office to accommodate 
numerous experiment margin allocations and there is no dependable accounting approach 
available to deduce the spacecraft price increases attributable to each experiment. 
Figure 2.4: Subcomponent Initial Estimated Prices vs Final Prices 
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 may well overstate the disparity between expected prices and 
actual prices. A very strong case can be made supporting the contention that NASA did 
29 As mentioned previously, the final price of the imaging experiment includes a number of upgrades 
and additions specifically requested, and partially funded, by NASA which in total account for perhaps 
$5M of the $17 .5M difference between initial estimated cost and final price. 
30for example, mass margin allocations to the gamma ray spectrometry experim~t had a vastly 
greater impact on the spacecraft center of mass than any other experiment due to this experiment's 
deployment on a long boom away from the body of the spacecraft. 
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not believe in, or intend to constrain the Project Office to, the initial $250 million total 
budget for the mission at the time when the bilateral monopolies were established.31 All 
the same, the fundamental acts of re-contracting for six of the eight major subcomponents 
suggest price escalation beyond the means and expectations of either the Project Office or 
NASA. Further, the acts of re-contracting can be explained as reactions to the 
inadequate acknowledgment of moral hazard driven inefficiencies in the initial 
subcontracts. The analysis supporting this contention is provided as Chapter 6 and 
benefits in exposition and credence from the intervening analytical treatments of Chapters 
3, 4, and 5. 
3lsee Charles Polk, 1990. 
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Chapter 3: Vertically Integrated Subcomponent Production 
3.0 Introduction to the Analytical Treatment 
The analysis provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, models R&D as a two step process, 
influenced by a correlation between the probabilistic nature of innovation and the self-
interested parties engaged in innovation. In Chapter 3 we introduce the basic production 
process removed from any agency complications. In Chapter 4 we analyze the same 
production process with a profit motivated agent and each of two types of principal; one 
contracting for an immediately marketable fmal good, the other for a single 
subcomponent to a final good composed of numerous subcomponents. Comparisons of 
our approach to that of the existing production organization literature are most 
appropriately made in Chapter 4 due to the commonalty of profit motivated agency. In 
Chapter 5 we introduce a different type of agent, one motivated by the capability of his 
subcomponent. The two types of subcomponent agency that are modeled in Chapters 4 
and 5 correspond to the profit seeking and performance seeking agents described in the 
Mars Observer case study of Chapter 2. 
We define R&D as follows: Research involves the effort to enhance the 
technological inputs to a particular subcomponent while Development incorporates the 
outcome of Research into actual production. R&D can be modeled as an iterative 
Research process leading to the version of a prototype considered optimal which is then 
Developed.32 Alternatively, a single Research endeavor may be undertaken with the 
intent of innovating a subcomponent to a many component final good. By this alternate 
model, the innovation will be Developed into the necessary subcomponent if it will result 
in value superior to available substitutes as assessed by the entity responsible for 
organizing final good production. The latter process does not preclude further R&D on 
the same subcomponent or any other, it simply reflects the incremental technological 
32 Guofu Tan, "Incentive Procurement Contracts with Costly R&D, • Caltech Social Science Working 
Paper 702, June 1989. 
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evolution of a complex production process. As we wish to model subcomponent 
production, we adopt the more incremental definition of R&D. 
A non-iterative, two step view of subcomponent R&D has advantages in the scope 
over which it may apply. By considering a production process organized by one 
Principal, but which integrates numerous distinct subcomponents, the incremental 
incorporation of technological advancement is explicitly considered. The Principal's 
overall R&D problem begins with the allotment of'heritage'; namely, which 
subcomponents should rely on existing technology. This results in a clear division of 
subcomponents into those which will be bought 'off-the-shelf from vendors and those 
which will undergo R&D. Those subcomponents targeted for R&D must then pass 
through the 'Make-or-Buy' procurement decision; namely, a decision over whether the 
R&D process should be managed directly by the Principal or contracted to another entity. 
The 'Make-or-Buy' decision will have much to do with the available contracting regimes 
and the various impacts of moral hazard. 
3.1 The Simple Case of Vertical Inte1m1tion 
Before considering various contracting regimes in Chapters 4 and 5, we begin 
with an analysis that includes the production processes and Principal which will be 
common throughout this work; however, our analysis will be uncomplicated by agency 
issues. Our introductory approach is meant to establish the basic qualities of the 
processes and the intent of the Principal so that the effects of agency on R&D 
subcomponent production may be distinguished later. 
Research is the initial process of innovation and its outcome, technology, is an 
interim goal of production, the qualities of which will affect the worth of proceeding with 
the Development of an innovated subcomponent If the level of technology produced 
from the Research process can be used to Develop a subcomponent in a manner superior 
in price and/or capability to existing subcomponents, then Development will proceed, 
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else innovation will be suspended and an "off-the-shelf' subcomponent will be used. 
Implicit in this description of Research and the decision process over the employment of 
its output, technology, is the probabilistic nature of technological innovation. 
A common nomenclature and clearly defined 
decision timing pattern are adopted to facilitate 
analytical treatment: Figure 3.1 provides a simple 
four period model of vertically integrated R&D. 
Each period represents an outcome, with the paths 
between periods representing decisions that affect the 
next outcome. Under the assumption that the 
Principal is cognizant of the nature of the whole 
process it is appropriate to describe Figure 3.1 from 
the period 3 outcome backward (the nomenclature 
defined here will be standard throughout the thesis). 
Figure 3.1: Decision Flow for 
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Given an arbitrary production budget of B, 
the Principal has residual funds of II= B-A-t 
for production of other subcomponents 
The period 3 outcome is a subcomponent with capability S where S is a 
function of the technology outcome of Research, T, and the amount of 
Development funding, t. Final production is assumed to proceed after 
period 3 with S being combined with other subcomponents purchased using 
funds, n, residual to the R&D effort. The Principal values subcomponent 
production of S relative to all of the subcomponents comprising the final 
good; therefore, the Principal's utility function is modeled as U[S(T, t), ll]. 
The period 2 outcome is the technology, T, developed from the Research 
process. Tis positively dependent upon the Principal's past Research 
investment decision, A, and a probabilistic element, e, drawn from a 
publicly known random distribution F(8) with density f(8). The minimum 
possible technology outcome is fixed by the pre-Research technology 
which will be referred to as the "off-the-shelf' level of technology and 
denoted as T0 • Upon observing T, the Principal decides what level of 
Development funding, t(T), to invest in the production of S. 
The period 1 outcome is simply that a Research effort funded by an 
investment A is underway. Nature will make the probabilistic decision 8 
that will critically affect the Research process. 
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The Period 0 outcome is that the Principal, having conducted a heritage 
decision process over all subcomponents to a final good, has concluded 
that the subcomponent, S, should undergo R&D. The Principal, knowing 
the nature of the coming R&D process, decides on a Research investment 
of A. 
The following functional characteristics specify the nature of the R&D process described 
above and illustrated in Figure 3.1: 
Outcome of Research is technology = T(A, 8) 
T(A, 8) is concave in both arguments Ti > 0, Tii < 0 
T(O, 8) =To [off-the-shelf] for all 8 
T(A, 8) ~To for all A~ 0 [revert toTo if8 outcome is 'bad'] 
T(A, 8) ~ Tmax for all A> 0 [support off(8) is independent of A] 
Outcome of Development is the subcomponent S(T, t(T)), 
S is concave in both arguments [Si > 0, Sii < 0], and Srt > 0 
t(T) is Development funding 
S(T, 0) = 0 for all T. 
Principal's Utility = U(S, m, U is concave in both arguments [Ui > 0, Uii < 0] 
S represents a subcomponent undergoing R&D 
n is funding for 'off-the-shelf sub-components 
The budget for production of the final good is B [arbitrary for our purposes] 
Assumption 3.1: The optimal Research investment is positive, A*> 0. The production 
process motivates this assumption in that if A* = 0, then the Principal is essentially 
deciding that all subcomponents should be 'heritage' subcomponents; i.e., no R&D should 
be done. A* = 0 would thus contradict the assumption that the initial condition at period 
0 is that the decision has already been made to innovate the subcomponent S. 
Solving backwards -- We first solve for Second Period Production Funding, t[T(A,8)]: 
£2 = U{S(T, t~ B - A - t] + yt 
a~ -· at 
y = 0 ift > 0 





We know that the solution t* to (3.2) will be a maximum if 
0 
; 2 < 0 
fJt 
Note that given the concavity of U and S, (3.3) will most certainly be less than zero if 
Usn ~ 0. The principal's utility is relative to the outcome of a final good production 
process which, by construction, is positively and jointly influenced by several 
subcomponents that are assembled to produce the final good. S is one such 
subcomponent and TI is a proxy for the other subcomponents as it represents the ability to 
procure them. Usn~ 0 is a mathematical representation of the positively and jointly 
valued nature of the various subcomponents in final good production; namely, the 
marginal value of increasing the capability of one subcomponent is increasing in the 
capability of all other subcomponents. Henceforth, this property will be referred to as 
'balance', in the sense that the Principal wishes to balance the constituent worth of all of 
the subcomponents relative to the final good. 
Assumption 3.2: Usn~ 0. 
Some comparative statics for the second period, Development funding decision, 
t*, illuminate the nature of the process and the effect of the research outcome, T(A, e) on 
the optimal funding decision: 
-TA(SrtUs + STStUss - STUsn) + StUsn - Umr - YA(A, e) 
soc2 








For(t..*,e) 3 -ST~Uss + SrUs1r < SnUs, ~te ~ Oand ~ ~ 
* ot 
a~-.* . 
Note that for any level of Research funding (!.), Development funding (t) may be 
decreasing in relation to the outcome of the Research [T(A. 8)]. Development funding that 
decreases in the outcome of a beneficial learning phase for one subcomponent is 
intuitively reasonable for multi-component production, because of the jointly valued 
worth of each subcomponent in the final product. This is implicit in the assumption that 
U is concave and not necessarily separable in S and n and is strengthened be Assumption 
3.2. Figure 3.2 illustrates the principal's utility space relative to Development funding. A 
potential t*(T) funding schedule is shown which is both increasing and decreasing in T. 
Figure 3.2: Principal's Utility Space with Sample Indifference Curves, Production 























Level of subcomponent 
technology, T 
Funds remaining for purchase of other subcomponents, n 
3.7 
28 
Next we solve for First Period Research Funding, 1..: 
3.8 
3.9 
fo = J v{~-n~.. e), t*(t., e)), B -t.. - t*(,., e*(e)de 
aa~ : J [ Us[TAST + t~St] - Un[1 + t~ ]f(8)d8 = 0 
aa~ : J[T'-~Us - Un + t~[StUs- Un]f(8)de = 0 3.10 
* From (3.2): StUs - Un = y (t. , e) 'r;f 8 
aa~ : J[T"~Us - Un- /(t., e)t~f(8)de = o 
* * From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: y (t., e )t'- = 0; therefore 
Note that (3.13) is always~ 0; thus, the solution, A.*, to (3.9) is a maximum. 
Theorem 1.1: The solution (A*, t*) to the R&D production model without agency 
concerns is the unique optimum. 
Proof: Immediate from Assumptions 3.1 & 3.2, the second order conditions (3.3) & 
(3.13), and the linearity of the constraint in (3.1). QED 
3.11 
In the absence of agency concerns, R&D subcomponent production organization 
is a straight forward multi-period dynamic programming process with decisions 
contingent on an observable Research outcome. The implicit value from balancing the 
performance contributed from the R&D subcomponent with the performance obtainable 
from other purchased subcomponents results in the explicit fact that Development 
funding may be negatively related to the success of Research. Such a negative 
relationship is analogous to the margin contacts described in Chapter 2 for the experiment 
subcomponents on Mars Observer. 
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Chapter 4: The Effects of Moral Hazard on R&D Procurement 
from a Profit Seeking Agent 
4.0 Profit Seeking Agent within a Subcomponent R&D Model 
In Chapter 4 we introduce an agent into the R&D subcomponent production 
process. When contracting with an agent, the process is physically the same as has been 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3. With 
agency, the organization of the R&D process 
for subcomponent S will vary depending on 
the type of agency and the information 
environment. Profit seeking agency is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 with the principal 
facing the single information asymmetry that 
the outcome of Research, T, is observed by 
both the principal and the agent, but the 
inputs to Research, A and 6, are observed 
only by the agent. 
Figure 4.1: Decision Flow if Contracting 
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Research funding, A, is chosen by the agent relative to the same publicly known 
probabilistic quality of the Research process for this subcomponent that pertained in 
Chapter 3 (modeled as the random variable e with density f(6)). Upon observing the 
outcome of Research, T, the agent chooses a level of Development funding, p(T), that is 
either directly observed by the principal or is effectively observed due to the principal's 
assumed knowledge of the production function for S and the observation ofT. Upon 
delivery of the subcomponent, the agent receives a payment based on a compensation 
function t(T) that was determined when the principal contracted the agent at the start of 
the R&D process. As modeled, the flow of funds from principal to agent represents a 
pure reimbursement contract. In practice, the flow of funds might well be some mix of 
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prepayment and reimbursement. 33 As our analysis is based on characterizing an optimal 
incentive compatible direct revelation (ICDR) contract, the Revelation Principle will 
assure that the optimal contract used in practice, regardless of its flow of funds, will 
correspond to the optimal ICDR contract based on the flow of funds illustrated.34 
If an optimal ICDR contracting arrangement is possible, then the Research 
funding, A., chosen by the agent will be truthfully revealed to the principal; thus, the agent 
can be directly compensated for A., leaving the agent's profit (net revenue) as (t - p). The 
agent, however, may have limited access to agent-specific Research assets such that 
committing 'A.-worth' of these assets represents an opportunity cost beyond simple 
transferable monetary expense; therefore, the function \P(A) is included in the agent's 
utility function, V, to account for this opportunity cost. 
Implicit in the structure of the process illustrated in Figure 4.1 is that the principal 
can enforce the outcome, S, of the subcomponent R&D production process. This means 
that the level of S delivered must be greater than or equal to the level that would result 
from the observed technology, T, and the observable Development funding p(T), else t(T) 
will be withheld from the agent If the principal cannot credibly withhold t( T), or in some 
other manner punish the agent, then the contract cannot be enforced. If the outcome of a 
proposed ICDR contract with a profit seeking agent cannot be enforced, then the 
proposed contract must be rejected as the agent's interests could not be credibly aligned 
with the principal's interests. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we characterize some ICDR analogs to a 
number of actual contracts so that the applicability of the results from Chapters 4 and 5 
will be more apparent. Figure 4.2 illustrates three types of contracts pertinent to actual 
33In the extreme, a contract with a warranty can be thought of as an over-payment contract where, 
depending on the performance of the item purchased, the agent may be obliged to return some portion of 
the prepayment. 
34For a basic treatment of the Revelation Principle see, Roger B. Myerson, "Incentive Compatibility 
and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 1, January 1979, pages 61-73. The terminology 
and use of the Revelation Principle employed in this thesis can be more directly referenced in, Roger B. 
Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic 
Theory, vol. 29, 1983, pages 267-268. 
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contracting that may result from the theoretical analyses that follow. The fixed 
price/performance award (FPPA) contract is a straight forward reward contract. The pure 
margin contact is somewhat analogous to an insurance contract, providing greater funding 
for Research Outcomes increasingly affected by bad luck. The partial margin contract is 
any mix of the FPPA and pure margin contract As shown in Chapter 3, without agency 
all three of these contracts represent possible optimal post-Research expenditures. In 
Chapter 4 we will show that the pure margin contract is not a possible optimal ICDR 
contract for profit seeking agency, though the FPPA and partial margin contracts are. In 
Chapter 5 we will show that all three are possible optimal ICDR contracts for 
performance seeking agency. 
Figure 4.2: Potential ICDR Analogs of Several 
Actual R&D Contract Forms 
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A production process captured by the first three periods of Figure 4.1 and 
simplified with a profit motivated principal contracting for a complete and marketable 
goodS [e.g.; U = U(S- $)]is essentially the simple moral hazard process studied by Ross 
[1973], Holmstrom [1979] and others.35 To establish a connection with the existing body 
35These authors have relied on the Revelation Principal to validate ICDR approaches that employ 
analysis of first order optimization conditions, as will be done throughout this thesis. Although the 
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of optimal contracting literature, the standard moral hazard problem is examined using 
the nomenclature employed throughout this thesis: 
The utility functions are simplified for the single component, single stage case: 
Principal's Utility; U = u[s- t(T)]: Agent's Utility; V = v(t)- tp(!-.) withU 
and v concave (U > 0, u" ~ 0: v' > 0, v" ~ 0), and tp convex (tp' > 0, tp" ~ 0). 
Given one-stage production, there is no interim production output, T; thus, 
the influence of the probabilistic element, e, is direct on the production of s. 
To ease mathematical analysis we take the conventional approach of 
suppressing e by viewing S as a random variable with distribution F(S, f..) 
and finite support [S0 , S]. Given a distribution of e, F(S, f..) is the 
distribution induced on S via the relationship S= S(f.., 8). Further, 
assume that F is convex in f..; i.e., FA< 0, Ft..t.. > 0. 
The goal of this introductory analysis, and of all the analyses to follow, is to 
characterize an optimal incentive compatible contracting arrangement between principal 
and agent Analysis proceeds in a standard fashion by defining the agent's optimization 
problem and then incorporating conditions that characterize the agent's optimum as 
constraints on the principal's choices of the contracting arrangement 36 The agency 
constrained principal's problem can be solved with respect to the decision variables and 
functionals of both the principal and agent-- the solutions to the first order conditions (if 
a maximum) will be an optimal ICDR contract form the principal's point of view. 
Agent's Problem: 
ICC: ddf.. {J[v(t)- tp(!-.)]fds} = 0 ===> Jvft..dS- tp' 0 4.1 
functional forms chosen and the questions of interest have varied, each of these authors have been able to 
characterize the optimal contract as positively monotonic in the outcome of the complete good that the 
agent was contracted to produce (e.g., an FPPA contract). Positive monotonicity is intuitively reasonable as 
both principal and agent are unambiguously made better off by increasing output in models with 
transferable utility. · 
36All analyses are conducted under the assumption that the principal is a monopsonist who may retain 
the agent's services subject to a known reservation wage. 
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Namely, the Agent wishes to balance the opportunity cost of expending A against the 
expected utility of profiting from the outcome of production, S. 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
J = f UfdS + vf [ v(t) - tp(A)]fdS + J.l[f vfA dS - tp'] + bA 
A necessary condition for optimum Research investment, A, is: 
Integrating by parts, (4.3) becomes 
UFA t - j;:t\ U'[l - t']dS + J.l(vFM 1:- J"!>FM t'v'dS + tp"] = -b 
The nature of the distribution function, F(8, A), allows for two useful simplifications: 
Therefore, 4.4 can be rewritten as 
The necessary condition for the optimal transfer, t(S), is: 
dJ 
dt 
- U' + yv'f + J.lV'fA = 0 'VS 
U' f 
= y + J.l....1. 'VS 
v' f 
-b 
The optimal transfer can be characterized by differentiating both sides of ( 4.6) with 
respect to S: 
t' = 
v'U" - J.lV'2%s(f'l{) 
v'U" + v"U' 
'VS 








Given the concavity of U and v, Assumption 4.1, and noting that 1-1 > 0 [due to 
Holmstrom, 1979], equation (4.7) is signable as greater than or equal to zero over all S. 
Referring to Figure 4.2, equation ( 4. 7) therefore characterizes a fixed price/performance 
award contract. 
Theorem 4.1: Given Assumption 3.1, the solutions (A*, t*(S)) to the first order 
conditions of the Principal's Problem [(4.3) and (4.6)] are the unique optimum for the 
case of complete production with a profit-seeking agent and one-stage production. 
Proof: Equation (4.7) satisfies an interior maximum sufficient condition for the agency 
constraint of (4.5) [the Agent's Problem]; this condition is the standard positive 
monotonicity result: 
t' ~ 0 V'S 37 
A corresponding sufficient condition for an interior maximum to the Principal's Problem 
(i.e., b = 0) is t' ~ 1 for all S [the condition is apparent from ( 4.5)]. This sufficient 
4.8 
condition does not necessarily follow from equation (4.7); however, if we accept the 
motivating rationale of Assumption 3.1 (A* > 0), then showing sufficiency for the 
principal is not necessary, as the principal would not have chosen subcomponent S to 
undergo R&D if, in expectation, he knew that choosing no R&D would result in at least 
as satisfactory an outcome.3B Accepting Assumption 3.1 also eliminates concern over the 
solutions to (4.5) and (4.6) being a local minimum as such a solution clearly would not 
have led the principal to choose the subcomponentS for R&D. Finally, the LeGendre 
condition is satisfied by (4.2). QED 
Corollary 4.1: Theorem 4.1 does not require Assumption 3.1 if the following 
relationship between the agent's relative risk aversion and the influence of moral hazard 
on the production organization problem holds: 
4.9 
which can be restated conceptually as 
37The sufficient condition represented by ( 4.8) also bas the interpretation that for any given investment 
by the agent, A. each differential increase in S results in more profit for the agent. 
38From (4.7) it is evident that without asymmetric information (i.e., J.J = 0), t' ~ 1 is satisfied. 
I The Agent's l 
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Proof: As stated in the proof of Theorem 4.1, a sufficient condition for the principal's 
maximization is t' ~ 1 for all S. Corollary 4.1 may thus be proven immediately by setting 
the left side of (4.7) less than or equal to 1. QED 
Corollary 4.2: Equation (4.9) is an overly strong sufficient condition for proving 
Theorem 4.1. 
Proof: By differentiating (4.5) w.r.t. "A, sufficiency only requires that 
-f F~ U'(1 - t']dS < 0, yet 4.9 == F~ U11 - t'] < 0 'tf S. QED 
The classic optimum contracting problem under a moral hazard agency condition 
ends here. The application modeled, the production function, the utility functions, and 
the probabilistic environment may vary, but the following two qualities of production 
organization remain the same in the classic treatments: one stage production, and 
procurement of a single component directly valued by the principal. The remainder of 
Chapter 4 will examine the effects of altering these two qualities with emphasis on 
modeling the incremental subcomponent R&D production that appears relevant to real-
world final good production. 
4.2 One Stage R&D Subcomponent Production 
The full R&D version of production organization diverges from the standard in 
two respects: 
(i) Subcomponent rather than complete production is modeled-- The 
outcome of R&D, S, is not directly valued, rather it is one of a number of 
components constituting a valued final product [U = U(S, TI)]. 
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(ii) A two-stage R&D process is modeled-- The outcome of Research 
becomes an input to Development. 
It is appropriate to examine the effects of (i) and (ii) separately before combining them 
into a full analysis. In section 4.2, the most immediate departure from section 4.1 is 
made; namely, one-stage subcomponent production is analyzed. The nomenclature and 
functional assumptions remain unchanged from section 4.1 with the exceptions that U = 
U(S, TI), U is concave (Ui > 0, Uii ~ 0), and Assumption 3.2 holds CUsn ~ 0). 
Agent's Problem: 
ICC: :A {J [v(t) - tp(A)}fds} = 0 ~ f vfAdS - tp' 0 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
J = JUfdS + yJ[v(t)- tp(A)]fdS + JI[JvfAdS- tp'] + bA 
Necessary condition for an optimum in A: 
:: f UfAdS + JI[J vfM dS - tp"] 
Integrating by parts, (4.12) becomes 




" = y + JI-" 'VS 
v' f 
- b 
The optimal transfer can be characterized by differentiating both sides of ( 4.14) with 









The agent has not changed between the standard moral hazard problem (Section 
4.1) and this subcomponent case; therefore, positive monotonicity remains a sufficient 
condition for the agent's maximization problem. However, unlike the contract 
characterized by equation (4.7) for a principal organizing complete production, (4.15) is 
not signable; it may be increasing or decreasing over all, part, or none of the range of S. 
With reference to Figure 4.2, the contract characterized by equation ( 4.15) may be any 
variation of the contracts shown, not just the FPPA contract yielded under complete 
production (section 4.1 ). This is a direct result of the positive tradeoff in the principal's 
utility function represented by U s1r ~ 0 and is analogous to the results of the no agency 
analysis of Chapter 3. Further, in direct contrast to complete production, under full 
information (J.J = 0), t' ~ 0 for all T. This is a crisp indication of the fundamentally 
different valuation faced by a principal organizing production at the subcomponent rather 
than the final good level. 
The principal has, however, changed. A sufficient condition for the principal to 
organize an R&D effort for the subcomponentS (f..*> 0), assuming that the solution to 
the Agent's problem was optimal, is that the slope of the transfer must be less than the 
ratio of the marginal valuations [immediate from (4.13]: 
t' ~ Us 'v'S 
un [analogous tot'~ 1 in Section 4.1]. 
This can be rewritten in terms of the Agent's relative risk aversion: 
It should be clear that the sufficient condition represented by ( 4.17) is not assured. 
Therefore, the solutions to first order conditions of the Principal's Problem need not 
represent optimal incentive production organizations; in other words, no Theorem 




The nature of possible solutions to the necessary conditions L(4.13) & (4.14)] can 
be exhaustively characterized by examining cases within three categories: Interior 
maximum, no R&D corner solution [.A* = 0], and a minimum. However, a fundamental 
assumption of the production processes examined in this research is that the decision to 
invest in the innovation of a subcomponent is made relative to an existing set of 
subcomponent choices. The decision to contract an agent for the R&D of a 
subcomponent is thus made with the knowledge that 
where P s
0 
= price of S 0 and S0 is the known existing subcomponent which the 
Principal has decided to have innovated. This is the justification for Assumption 3.1 (.A* 
> 0), and is also the justification for our not bothering to characterize solutions to the 
Principal's Problem that represent no R&D corner solutions or a minimum. The possible 
solutions representing interior maxima are mathematically described below and 
illustrated in Figures 4.3 through 4.6: 
Interior maximum 
Case A: t' ~ Us V Sand tp" > - J FM t'v'dS: the contract explicitly satisfies the 
u1T 
overly strong sufficient condition that the principal is better off for each 
differential increase in S, but only satisfies the weakest condition for the agent 
Case B: 0 ~ t' ~ Us VS : the contract explicitly satisfies the overly strong 
u1T 
sufficient conditions that both Principal and Agent are better off for each 
differential increase in S. 
CaseC: t' ~ 0 VS, - JFJ..[Us - t'U1r)dS ~ 0, and-JFM[Us- t'U1r]dS ~ 0 
the contract explicitly satisfies the overly strong sufficient condition that the 
agent is better off for each differential increase in S, but only satisfies the 
weakest conditions for the principal. 
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CaseD: t' ~ 0 & t ' ~ ..!:!.s. for enough S such that the sufficient conditions hold ... 
u1T 
Caveat: Case A allows for a complete margin contract, t' ~ 0 for all S. However, with 
the reasonable assumption that the cost of innovating S, A., is greater than the 'Off-the-
Shelf price of S0 , then t' ~ 0 for all S is not an interior maximum as the Agent would 
perform no Research, buy S0 'Off-the-Shelf, and pocket the difference. Similar 




Figure 4.3: Case A 
Partial Margin Contact, Principal Bias 
u~u(S, ••<~:~l I /\ 
--~-- S ------
Funds Remaining for Purchase 
of other Subcomponents 
Figure 4.5: Case C 
1f 
Fixed Price/Performance Award, Agent Bias 
. ,. t(S)I ; 
- - - ! - - - - -~-~- - - £ - - - - - -," --
Funds Remaining for Purchase 
of other Subcomponents 
1f 
Figure 4.4: Case B 
Fixed Price/Performance Award, no Bias 
U=U(S, B-t(S)] 
Funds Remaining for Purchase 
of other Subcomponents 
s 
Figure 4.6: CaseD 




Funds Remaining for Purchase 
of other Subcomponents 
s 
40 
Cases B and C have the characteristics of the optimal FPPA contract assured by 
Theorem 4.1 in section 4.1: t' ~ 0 for all S. The additional complication of a 
subcomponent production process has rendered Cases B and C to be two of four possible 
optimal production organizations within a production process that, without assuming an 
interior solution, need not have an interior optimum. 
4.3 Standard Two Sta.:e R&D Production 
The two-stage, production process shown in Figure 4.1, but simplified with U = 
U[S- t], is markedly similar to the R&D model of Guofu Tan [June 1989].39 Tan models 
both single and multiple agent cases. His single agent case is the one of interest here. 
His model's fundamental difference from ours is that the outcome of Research (T) along 
with the inputs to research (A., 8) are not observable, only the final output is observable. 
Thus, the root moral hazard problem is augmented by an interim adverse selection 
problem. 40 The two models diverge further in the functional restrictions that Tan 
imposes: Agent and Principal are risk neutral, U is linearly separable inS and II, and V 
is linearly separable in T and A. All the same, the significance of information 
asymmetries in R&D procurement are highlighted in Tan's work and he is able to show 
results similar in spirit to the body of the more standard research. For purposes of direct 
comparison with his research, we present a version of R&D procurement without the 
interim adverse selection problem, but with a Principal and Agent that may be risk 
averse. 
Referring to Figure 4.1, p( T) is a monitorable development expenditure made by 
the Agent which when combined with the outcome of Research, T, yields S(T, p). Gross 
compensation to the Agent is t(T); however, the net compensation, analogous to the 
transfer in the one period model, is (t- p). The model and the nomenclature employed 
39 Tan's physical production environment is quite similar, including an equivalent definition of off-the-
shelf technology, T 0 • 
40 In Section 4.5, we will examine the effect of an unobservable Research outcome. 
41 
are the same as in section 4.1 except that an interim production stage has been added and 
the agent's utility function must account for the new definition of compensation. Thus; 
we suppress e by viewing i as a random variable with distribution F(T, ~) 
and finite support [T0 , T]. Given a distribution of8, F(T, ~)is the 
distribution induced on i via the relationship i = T(~. 8). Further, assume 
that F is convex in~; i.e., Ft-.< 0, Ft-.t-. > 0. 
s = s(T, t(T)), si > o, sii ~ o, and sTt ~ o 
V = v(t(T)- p(T)) - tp(~), U = u{S - t(T)). 
Incorporating the interim production ofT, the analysis proceeds as follows: 
Agent's Problem: 
ICC: d~ {J [v(t- p) - w(~)]fm} = o =- f vf t-.dT - w' 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
Necessary Condition for an optimal~ 
Integrating by parts yields 
Necessary Condition for an optimal t(T) 
dJ 
dt 
-U' + yv'f+ J..lV'ft-. = 0 'VT 
U' f 
= y + J..l~ VT 
v' f 
Necessary Condition for an optimal p(T) 
dJ S U' =- _P_ = 
dp v' 
f 












Comparing (4.22) with (4.23) yields 
Differentiating each side of ( 4.24) with respect toT yields 
stp + p'~p = o 'VT 
s 
p' = - __!£_ ~ 0 
Spp 
Differentiating each side of (4.22) w.r.t T and substituting for p' using (4.25) yields 
v'( U"( ST + p'Sp - t')] - v"(t' - p')U' = ~v'2 :T( f;) 
Substituting in ( 4.24) and rearranging yields 
v'STU" - ~v'2 ~T(f'lr) 
t' = p' + ~ p' ~ 0 
v'U" + v"U' 
From ( 4.21 ), as with the standard moral hazard problem illustrated in section 4 .1, a 
sufficient condition for the Agent's maximization problem is that the transfer be 
positively monotonic. From ( 4.27) it is obvious that: 
(t' - p') ~ 0 'VT 
Similarly, from (4.21) and (4.24), a sufficient condition for an interior maximization to 
the Principle's problem is 









(4.29) is markedly similar to (4.9), and is also an overly restrictive sufficient condition. 
We may now pose a theorem for two stage, single component production analogous to 
Theorem 4.1 for one stage, single component production. 
Theorem 4.2: Given condition (4.29) or Assumption 3.1, the candidate solution to the 
R&D production of the complete item represented by the first order conditions [( 4.20), 
(4.22), and (4.23)] is the unique optimum and has a form analogous to the Fixed 
Price/Performance Award contract. 
Proof: Same as in Theorem 4.1. QED 
Commentary 
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that production with R&D of the complete/marketable item 
adds computational but not substantive complexity to the standard optimal contracting 
outcomes. 
4.4: Two Stage R&D Subcomponent Production 
In this section we analyze the full model illustrated in Figure 4.1, with both two 
stage and subcomponent production. The nomenclature used is the same as in section 4.3 
except that subcomponent production rather than complete production is modeled; 
namely, U = U[S(T, p(T)), fl]. Analysis proceeds in the now familiar fashion: 
Agent's Problem: 
ICC: :A {f [v(t- p) - tp(i..)]fm} = 0 => f vf ,._dT - tp' 0 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
J = JUfdT + vf[v- tV]fdT + ll[Jvf,._ds- tp'] 





Integrating by parts (4.32) becomes 
The necessary conditions for optimal R&D price and Development cost functions are: 
dJ u f 
==> _lL = y + IJ_.1. '<:/T 
dt v' f 
4.34 
dJ SpUs f,._ 
==> -- = Y + IJ- '<:/T 
dp v' f 
4.35 
Combining (4.34) and (4.35) yields 
4.36 
Differentiating 4.36 with respect to T yields 
4.37 
Differentiating (4.34) with respect toT yields 
4.38 
Rearranging (4.38), we get 
p'[v'SpUS7T + v"U7T]- t'(v'U7T7T + v"U7T) IJV'2 :T(f;) - v'STUS7T 4.39 
(4.37) and (4.38) can be placed in matrix form as 
B = 
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Recalling that net compensation (t- p) is the critical contractual concern, applications of 
Cramer's Rule and rearrangement yield 
t'-p' = 
J.lv'
2 %T(f'fr')n- v'[ STUs7T( spus1r- SvvUs) + sTV Us( sP Us1r - u 7T7T )] 
vi u7T7T(sppUs + S~Uss) - S~Us~] - v"O 
where 0 
Commentary 
The inclusion of subcomponent production prevents (4.40) from being signed. This is 
true even if one assumes risk neutrality for both principal and agent Thus, the 
complication added to the standard optimal contracting problem is more than a matter of 
computational haze; the addition of subcomponent considerations fundamentally affects 
contracting decisions. 
From (4.33) and (4.36), sufficient conditions for maximization are 
( ) STUS t' - p' .$ 'VT from the Principal's concerns, and 
u7T 
(t' - p') ~ 0 'VT from the Agent's. 
As with the one stage subcomponent production analyzed in section 4.2, these sufficient 
conditions are not discernible from the necessary conditions on the candidate optimum 
contract ( 4.40). The complete lack of apparent monotonicity in ( 4.40) is important, 
intuitive, and essentially the same as in the one period case. Simply put, the profit 
4.40 
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seeking agent's basic desire for a contact which is increasing in output may not be 
reconcilable with the principal's fundamental intent to 'balance' the subcomponent inputs 
to overall production. 
The optimal subcomponent R&D contracts which can, but need not necessarily 
result from the first order conditions to the Principal's Problem [(4.32), (4.34), and (4.35)] 
are essentially those illustrated in Figures 4.3 through 4.6. Even though the possible 
optimum contracts have the same characteristics with or without interim production, there 
is a significant reason for a principal organizing subcomponent production to be 
concerned with the outcome of an interim production step if one exists -- Knowledge of 
the outcome of interim production improves the principal's ability to optimally balance 
production decisions for other subcomponents that are being concurrently produced. 
Thus the ability to observe the outcome of interim production is significant to the optimal 
contracting decision. 
4.5 The Relevance of the Observable 
Assume that the outcome of interim production, T, is not observable. Instead after 
Research is concluded, the agent states an outcome, i = T - E; the principal provides the 
payment t(i); and the agent produces S(T, p*). The Research outcome will be 
understated (E > 0) if the agent benefits from such a statement. This sequence is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 7 which is equivalent to Figure 4.1 with the addition of the agent's 
transmittal of i to the principal. The extent of understatement is bound by the principal's 
assumed ability to enforce the outcome of subcomponent production -- Actual production 
must equal that claimed; mathematically, 
~ T, p *) = s(i, p(i)) 4.41 
Applying the implicit function theorem to 
(4.41 ), we know that there exists a p*(E) 
and that 
* PI = 4.42 
We can now characterize misrepresenta-
tion when Tis not observable: 
o£ 
0£ v{ 
I I*] - t - p = - p 
Substituting in the expression for p'* from 
( 4.42) and rearranging: 
t I - PI = ST + .E._ 
sp V 1 
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Figure 4.7: Profit Seeking Agent without 
an Observable Research Outcome 
Agent 1 Nature 1 Principal 






Output= S(T, p*(t:)) 
V = v[t( T) -p*] - ljl(A) 





II= B ~( T) 
U[S, II] 
Note that if p > 0, then E = 0, i = T, and the lack of an observable is irrelevant The 
condition on (t1 - p') for this follows directly from (4.43) 
tl- PI > ..&. 
sP 
Theorem 4.3: Whether organizing production directly for the complete final good 
[section 4.3] or for subcomponents to the final good [section 4.4], no interior optimal 
ICDR contract (i.e., a contract that includes R&D, A.*> 0) based on a stated but 
unobserved Research outcome is possible. 
Proof: For Complete Production [Section 4.3] 
A condition of the optimization in section 4.3 ( 4.24) was that Sp = 1 for all T; thus, for i 
= T, condition (4.44) becomes t 1 - p1 > ST which over all T violates the necessary 
condition ( 4.21) for A. being an optimum. 
For Subcomponent Production [Section 4.4] 
[Proof by contradiction] Posit that for some T, the agent states the truth, i = T. Posit that 




(t' - p') ~ STUs; i.e., the principal's utility is greater than it would have been at 
u7T 
. sUs s U 
T-OT. Therefore, at this T, by (4.44), _T __ > __I_~ sp > __lL. Were there no agency 
u7T sP Us 
concerns, the principal would determine optimum p(T) by maximizing U[S(T, p(T)), B-
p(T)] which results in the condition that SP = U7T . Any 'Cost of Agency' will cause 
Us 
SP < U 1T • This contradicts the assumption that the compensation function [t(T) - p(T)] 
Us 
was an optimal contract. This contradiction holds over all T. QED 
Thus, if the outcome of Research, T, is not observable, then an optimum incentive 
compatible contracting arrangement must be conditioned on the fmal outcome of 
subcomponent production, S, as in sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
4.6 Summary 
Under complete production [sections 4.1 and 4.3], conditions can be established 
such that the solutions to the first order conditions are contracts between principal and 
agent that optimally account for the agency concerns, assuming the Research outcome is 
observable. If the inclusion of a second production period is meant to adequately 
represent the Development stage of an R&D process [section 4.3], then we conclude that 
R&D adds nothing fundamental to the moral hazard problem. If, however, production 
influenced by R&D is more appropriately modeled with a subcomponent approach 
[sections 4.2 and 4.4], then we have shown that contracts with profit seeking agents that 
optimally account for moral hazard concerns may not result. Before searching for 
possible third-best optima based on modifications to the solutions from sections 4.2 and 
4.4 (as in Guesnerie and Laffont) examination of alternate production organizations is 
appropriate and constitutes the analysis of Chapter 5.41 
41 Roger Guesnerie and Jean-Jacques I..Affont, "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent 
Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm, • Journal of Public Economics, vol. 
25, 1985, pages 329-369. 
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Chapter 5: The Effects of Moral Hazard on R&D Procurement 
from a Performance Seeking Agent 
5.0 Justification of Performance Seeking Agency 
When the government or a managing principal of the government contracts for a 
new subcomponent of a scientific program or a new technology element to a scientific 
endeavor, it often seeks out the effort of a Scientist in the field of interest This Scientist 
becomes the agent of the government or the government's managing principal and is 
funded to undertake the R&D, usually under the condition that he may not directly profit 
from the work (beyond an agreed salary). Such a condition is satisfactory for the 
Scientist as the career impact of being involved is substantial. 
Alternatively, consider a manager in a large company or government research lab 
who has been given the assignment to conduct the R&D of a new subcomponent to some 
larger task. Such a manager agent will garner substantial career advancement potential 
from a successful R&D effort. Agents such as these are clearly motivated by the 
performance of the subcomponent that they have been contracted to innovate. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates R&D 
contracting to a performance seeking agent. 
The organization of production differs from 
that of Figure 4.1 as follows: 
This type of agent may have limited access to 
capital markets; thus, initial funds, b, may be 
provided to the agent as a Research Price. 
The price of Development, t, is transferred to the 
agent without any additional compensation. 
The only source of monetary compensation for 
the agent is (b-A). 
Disutility of forgoing compensation, O~(b-A)<b, 
or of providing independent funding, (b-A)<O, is 
captured by \j)(A-b) in the utility function, V. 
Figure 5.1: Decision Flow if Contracting 






V = v(S) + \P(A-b) 
- - -·-- - - . - - -
I1 = B - b - t(T) 
U(S, TI) 
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The basic information asymmetry remains unchanged from Chapter 4; the 
outcome of Research, T, is observed by both principal and agent, but the inputs to 
Research, A and 8, are observed only by the agent. The agent may choose to take 
advantage of the moral hazard inherent in the Research portion of the task by reporting a 
Research cost of A while having actually expended A* < A and retaining (b- A*) > (b- A) 
for himself. In the case of a Scientist agent the motivation for skimming the quantity (A-
A*) may take the form of padding other grants, adding equipment, augmenting staff, 
'buying-out' teaching requirements, travel, etc ... For a manager, likely uses of skimming 
include the pursuit or retention of other business (a portfolio management use) or the ever 
suspected act of 'empire building' within the larger organization to which the manager 
belongs. 
Implicit in the structure of the process illustrated in Figure 5.1 is that the principal 
can enforce the outcome, S, of the subcomponent R&D production process. This means 
that the level of S delivered must be greater than or equal to the level that would result 
from the observed technology, T, and the transferred Development price t(T), else some 
binding and effective form of punishment will be inflicted on the agent. If the principal 
cannot credibly punish the agent for a lower performance output, then the contract cannot 
be enforced and the organizational problem, as stated, is ill-defined. 
The nomenclature and functional assumption for the performance seeking agent 
are very similar to section 4.4 with the exclusion of p( T) and the necessary modifications 
to the agent's utility, V, amounting to v' > 0, v" < 0, lp' < 0, lp" < 0. Analysis proceeds in 
two sequential steps: Full Information and Incomplete Information. 
5.1 Subcontractin~ under Full Information 
The agent's Participation Constraint 
J[v(s(T,t(r))] + \P(A-b)jf(T, A)dT ~ K 
The Principal's problem may then be formed as 
5.1 
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1 = Ju[S(T, t(T)), B-b-t(T)]f(T, t..)dT + v[J[v + w]f(T, t..)dT- K] +flb +pt.. 5.2 
b, A,t(T) 
The First Order Conditions are: 
OJ 
ob 
Pointwise optimization of J relative to t yields: 
Lemma 5.1: Un - StU s > 0 for all T. 
Proof: Immediate from y > 0. QED 
The third first order condition (5.5) can be used to obtain the first derivative of the 
optimal contract by differentiating each side relative to T. 
t' = _ SrSt[v'(StUss- Us7T) - v"(StUs - u7T)] + v'STtU7T 
sf(v'(StUss- Us7T) - v"(StUs - U7r)) - v'St(StUS7T - U7T7T) + v'SuU1r 
Note that t' may be <=> 0. 
Lemma 5.2: The contract under complete information has the property that 
Proof: From 5.6: 




X = S:(v'(~Uss- Us7T) - v"(StUs - U1r)) 
where A = v SrtU7T > 0 
ls = v'(SttU7T- St(StUS7T- U7T7T)] < 0 










Lemma 5.3: The contract under complete information has the property that 





< - < - QED 5.10 
C + v'SuU7T 
Theorem 5.1: If S(T, t) is separable in its arguments (i.e., STt = 0), then the contract 
under complete information has the property that t' ~ 0 for all T. [A pure margin contract] 
Proof: Immediate from L5.2 and L5.3. QED 
Assumption 5.1: The solution, t*, to the first order conditions has the property 
t' < 'rj T. 
Theorem 5.2: Given Lemma 5.2 and Assumption 5.1, the contract under complete 
information has the property that for each increase in T, both the Principal and the Agent 
are made better off. This property is captured by the following inequality: 
Proof: That the inequality implies that both would be better off over all dT is shown 
dS 
= ST + t'St :. t' > - ST 
dS 
> 0 ===> 
dT st dT 
dU 
STUs - t'(U7T - StUs) :. t' < 
STUS dU > o. QED = ===> 
dT (u7T - st Us) dT 
5.11 
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Corollary 5.1: If the relative risk aversion condition 
v" S -- > _]!_ + 
v' - ~St 
holds, then Assumption 5.1 is satisfied and Theorem 5.2 holds: 
Proof: Follows directly by establishing the condition on t' such that the Principal would 




Set this as the maximum t' allowed relative to the candidate solution (5.6): 
Un - stus 
STSt[v'(StUss- Usn) - v"(StUs - Un)] + v'SnUn 
Rearranging tenns and separating out all v' and v" terms yields: 
Cancellation and further rearrangement leads to the desired result: 
v" > Slt + 0 'VT 




0 = SuUsUn - StUs(StUsn - U1T1T) + StUn(StUss- Usn) ~ 0 'VT. QED 
Corollary 5.2: IfUss, Umr, Usrr, and v" = 0 [Tan's Assumptions], then 
1. t' = - slt 'V T 
Stt 
d d 
11. dT[Un- StUs] = dT[Stv'] = 0 'VT 
m. Assumption 5.1 holds, implying that Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 hold. 
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Proof: 
1. immediate from (5.6) {maximum slope by L5.3} 
n. d/dt[Un- StUs] 
d/dt[Stv'] 
= t'[v"sf + v'Su) + v"S-rS1 + v'STt = 0 
iii. immediate from (ii) and LS.l. QED 
Commentary 
Corollary 5.2 provides a useful comparison to the existing R&D contracting literature 
when one adds the element of an agent motivated by the capability of his output. Under 
conditions of optimum risk sharing, the optimum contract has the standard properties of 
positive monotonicity in the observable and uniformly increasing utilities for Principal 
and Agent with each increase in the observable. These results suggest that the new type 
of agency introduced here does not, in and of itself, fundamentally affect contracting. 
The R&D production decision is made relative to available, known 
subcomponents that do not require R&D. By assumption, the subcomponentS has been 
chosen to undergo R&D while all other subcomponents are purchased directly using TI. 
Therefore, we know that the expected value of the Principal's utility, E[U], is greater than 
the known solution, U0 , or else the decision to perform R&D on subcomponentS would 
not have been made. 
Comparing the model in section 5 to those in section 4, recall that with 
subcomponent production (sections 4.2 and 4.4), optimal risk sharing under complete 
information, 1..1 = 0, did not necessarily result in both the Principal and Agent being better 
off over all levels of output. This was shown with complete production (sections 4.1 and 
4.3). Further, it could not definitely be shown in sections 4.2 and 4.4 that the full (or 
5 .17 
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incomplete) information solution resulted in either the Principal or Agent being better off 
in expectation. Though Theorem 5.2, Corollary 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 we have shown 
conditions under which the R&D model of section 5 exhibits the standard qualities of 
optimal risk sharing under complete information. By Theorem 5.3 we will establish that 
both Principal and Agent are generally better off in expectation under full information for 
the model of subcomponent R&D production examined in section 5. 
Theorem 5.3: Given Assumption 3.1, ifUss, Umr, v" s 0, and Usn~ 0, then both the 
Principal and Agent are better off over all T. 
Proof: 
That the Agent is better off over all Tis provided by Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.2. 
That the Principal is better off is shown through examination of condition ( 5.4) and the 
initial assumption that E[U] > U0 • 
By Assumption 3.1, p = 0 and the participation constraint (5.1) holds; therefore y > 0. 
Now define the Marginal R&D case (MR&D) as the solution to conditions (5.2, 5.3, and 
5.4) that results in 
(5.4) 
Now examine the nature of MR&D for a differential increase in /..: 
B L52 
OA [fvft..dT + lP'] = JvfAJ..dT + \P" = -JFA"-v'(ST + t'St)dT + \P" < 0 
Therefore, from (5.4 ), J U f "-dT > 0 for R&D efforts above MR & D 
Now assume that at MR&D the Principal opts for U0 rather than for E[U]; therefore 
JUft.. dT > 0 for all R&D undertaken ==> - fFt..( ~~)dT > 0, 
which implies that the Principal is better off in expectation for all R&D undertaken. QED 
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5.2 Subcontracting under Incomplete Information 
In this section, the information asymmetry illustrated in Figure 5.1 and common 
to the analyses in Chapter 4 is considered for the performance seeking agent. This 
asymmetry should result in a moral hazard agency concern as the performance interests 
of the agent do not perfectly overlap those of the principal. 
The Agent's problem is to choose A. to maximize 
0 {ICC} 
As before, the participation constraint is 
J[v(S(T,t(r))] + tp(A.-b}jf(T, A.)dT ~ K {PC}. 
The Agency Constrained Principal's problem 
5.18 
5.19 
J = f U[S, n}'( T, A.)dT + v[J [v + lp )f(T, A.)dT - K] + 11[J vf,_dT + tp'] + TJb +pt... 5.20 
b,A,t(T) 
First Order Conditions 
OJ 
ob 
~~: f Uf,_dT + ll[f vfMdT + tp"] + p = 0 
Integration of (5.22) by parts yields: 
- JF,_(SrUs- t'(Un- StUs)]dT + J.l[tp"-JFMv'(ST + t'St)dT] + P 
Pointwise optimization of J relative tot yields: 
f,._ 
= - y - J.l- "if T 
f 







Sy.St[v'(St Uss - Us1r) - v"(SrUs - U7T )] + v'Sn U7T + IJ(v'Sr )
2 -£:-( +) 
st[v'(SrUss - Us1r) - v"(Sr Us - U7T )] - v'Sr(StUS7T - U7T7T) + v'Srt U7T 
Note that t' may be<=> 0. 
In order to prove that these first order conditions describe the optimal solution to the 
R&D problem illustrated in Figure 5.1 and in order to characterize the incentive 
compatible contract t(T), a series of lemmas and theorems follows: 
Lemma 5.4: In the incomplete information case, as with complete information, StU s -
Un ~ 0 for all T. 
Proof: Define ¥ as the space of (S, II) pairs on which the Principal's utility may be 
assessed. Also define t* as a candidate for the optimal contract from the first order 
conditions to Model III. For any true t *, we know that 
i. 
ii. 
StUs - u7T f,._ 
= - y - IJ-
Srv' f 
f 
.:1.. <=> 0 depending on T 
f 
m. :. StU s - U 1T < 0 for some T regardless of 1J <=> 0. 
The proof proceeds by contradiction: 
5.25 
Assume that given t *, for some T, StU s - Un > 0. Then from (iii) there is a point B 
in¥ where StUs - Un = 0. Further, characterize t* by the intervals in¥ around B 
* over[A, B]t (T)s.t SrUs- U7T ~ 0 
over (B, C] r*(T) s.t. StUs - U7T > 0 
{ 
* . - t over [A, B] 
Now constder t = 
s. t. StUs - U7T = 0 over (B, C] 
Over (B, C] note that both Principal and Agent are better off with t ** then with t*; 
therefore t * cannot be the optimal solution. This is a contradiction, and thus 
StUs - Un ~ 0 for all T. QED 
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Theorem 5.4: J..l > 0; i.e., there is a moral hazard agency contracting concern. 
Proof: Assume the contrary; i.e., J..l ~ 0. Denote by t( T) the transfer required under the 
optimum risk sharing condition (5.5) to result in the incomplete information participation 
shadow price defined by 
y 
forT E (TifA(T,A) > 0) 
lstus- u7T l l§ti.rs- i.r7T l 
- l St v' J ~ y = - l St v' j 
rt(T) ~ t(T) 
,. ~n- ~ n 
ls ~ s 
I~(T) ~ t(T) ,. 1T~1T 
ls ~ s 
I~(T) = t(T) ,. n=n 
ls = s 
Combining these results with Lemma 5.1, we have 
Integrating by parts 








.·. f Uf,_dT > 0 
This implies, by the assumption that the agent's problem (5.22) has an interior solution, 
that the coefficient of lJ must be negative; thus requiring lJ > 0. This is a contradiction. 
:. 1J > 0. QED 
Lemma 5.5: Given Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.4, t' > - Sr "if T [a sufficient 
st 
condition for (5.19) to characterize the solution of the Agent's problem] 
Proof: Recall the expression for t' under incomplete information (5.25) 
t' = 
SrSt[v'(StUss-Usn)- v"(StUs-Un)] + v'SnUn + 1J(v'St)2 ~(t) 
s?[v'(StUss-Usn)- v"(StUs-Un)]- v'St(StUsn-U1T7T) + v'SuUn 
This can be rewritten as 
t' = 
t' = A > -
Commentary 
For subcomponent R&D production under profit seeking agency (section 4.3) we were 
unable to show that the contract resulting from the first order conditions had the property 
that the agent was better off for each differential increase in the Research outcome. This 
failing prohibited the establishment of any Theorem characterizing optimal R&D 
contracting with a profit seeking agent. Under performance seeking agency we have 
proven Lemma 5.5 which establishes that the agent is better off for each differential 







Assumption 5.2: t' < for all T. [The Principal is better off for each T] 
U7T - StU7T 
Theorem 5.5: Given Assumption 5.2 or Assumption 3.1, the solution {b*, A*, t(T)*} 
derived from the frrst order necessary conditions to the Principal's problem (5.19) is the 
unique optimum solution and results in positive research investment [A > 0]. 
Proof: 
1. From (5.23) it is clear that Lemma 5.5 provides a sufficient condition for the 
Agent's optimization with respect to A. 
u. Assumption 5.2 is a sufficient condition for concavity with respect to A of the 
maximand in the Principal's optimization problem: 
The second derivative of the maximand combined with A5.2 yields 
ii. The Principal's side of (5.21) is quasi-concave, the Agent's convex: 
The maximum will occur in the interior. QED 
Commentary 
The optimal ICDR contract assured under Theorem 5.5 may take any of the forms 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. This should be apparent from Lemma 5.5 and Assumption 5.2. 
Thus, if we observe a pure margin contract let to a performance seeking agent we cannot 
automatically conclude that the production organization is sub-optimal as we can with a 
I profit seeking agent 
Corollary 5.3: Assumption 5.2 and its role in Theorem 5.5 can be characterized by the 
relative risk aversion condition [Analogous to Corollary 5.1]: 
-~ ~ Sy.t + ).J v'St ~(f"') + 0 VT 
v' STSt STU7T dT f StU7T(u7T - StUs) 
0 = SuUsU7T- StUs(S1Us7T- Urrrr) + S1U7T(StUss- Us7T) :$; 0 VT. 
Proof: Immediate with the same approach as Corollary 5.1. QED 
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Commentary 
Moral hazard agency concerns have been shown to pertain for R&D subcomponent 
production with a performance seeking agent (Theorem 5.4). Given that we accept the 
motivating assumption that the principal has decided to innovate S as opposed to all other 
subcomponents (Assumption 3.1, 1..* > 0), then we have shown that an optimal incentive 
compatible contract (b*, t*(T)) satisfies the first order conditions in the interior. 
5.3 The Relevance of the Observable 
Assume that T is not observable. Instead after Research is concluded, the agent 
states an outcome, i = T- E; the principal provides the payment t(T); and the Agent 
produces S(T, t*). This sequence is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
Definition of Enforcement: 
~ T,t) = s(l-,t(l-)) 5.35 
By the implicit function theorem, we know 
that there exists a t*(E) and that 
5.36 
Characterization of misrepresentation when 
T is not observable: 
o£ * * - t' v'St - t' lp' + t'lp' = -p 
0£ 
Figure 5.2: Interested Agent without 
an Observable Research Outcome 
Agent • Nature • Principal 





Output= S(T, t*(E)) 
V =v(S) + q>[A.-b+t*-t( T)] 
n = B- b -t( i) 
U(S,ll) 
Substituting in the expression for t'* from the enforcement condition and rearranging: 
, Sr r "'' 1 t = --Lt + -,-J + p 
St v St 
Note that if p > 0, then E = 0, i = T, and the lack of an observable is irrelevant. The 
condition on t' for this follows directly from (5.37) 
5.37 
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I s,. I \V 1 l I \V 1 l 




From Lemma 5.5 we know that t 1 > - S,. ; thus, f determines the relevance of the 
St 
b bl d b th h f 
1
1 
Marginal Dis utility of Revealing T l 
o serva e an can e oug t o as l + J · 
Marginal Utility of Revealing T 
Therefore, r represents an agent attribute that affects whether or not interim adverse 
selection binds. 
Theorem 5.6: When contracting with a performance seeking agent, an optimal ICDR 
R&D contract with an unobserved Research output is possible if, for all Research 
outcomes, the agent's marginal utility from skimming, -tp' is less than or equal to its 
marginal utility from not skimming, v'St. 
- - STUs Proof: Posit a candidate optimal t (T) such that Assumption 5.2 holds; t I< ---'---
Un - StUn 
at a particular T. If t (T) is such that at this same T condition (5.38) is satisfied, then we 
know that 
By Lemma 5.4 (Un- S1Us ~ 0), we know that if -~ < 1, then i = T. From 
V
1St 
Theorem 5.5, we know that one possible optimum incentive compatible contract has the 
\VI 
property that Assumption 5.2 holds for all T; thus, as long as - -- < 1 "i/ T the agent 
V
1St 
will state the true outcome of Research, T, when Tis unobservable. QED 
5.4 Summary 
In Chapter 5 we have shown that an optimal ICDR R&D subcomponent contract 
can generally be arranged between a managing principal and a performance seeking 
agent. This is in contrast to Chapter 4, section 4.4, which indicated that no Theorem 
stating a similar general result could be attained with a profit seeking agent. More 
5.38 
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strongly still, in the absence of an observable Research outcome, optimal R&D 
production organization, based on the truthful revelation of the Research outcome by the 
agent, is possible under performance seeking agency but not under profit seeking agency. 
This is potentially a critical production organization consideration as knowing the 
outcome of Research allows the principal to concurrently balance the production of the 
other subcomponent inputs to the final good. These results do not suggest that a 
managing principal should organize all subcomponent production using performance 
seeking agents; merely that a managing principal should be aware of the characteristics of 
various possible agencies when it optimizes final good production organization. 
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Chapter 6: An Analytical Treatment of Mars Observer 
Production Organization 
6.0 Segue from Theory to Observation 
The Mars Observer experience described in Chapter 2 highlights R&D efforts 
characterized by subcomponent production, profit seeking and performance seeking 
agents, and issues of whether the outcome of Research is observable and the outcome of 
Development enforceable. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 we examined theoretical R&D 
production organizations characterized by subcomponent production, profit and 
performance seeking agents, and the effects of observability and enforceability. The 
intent of Chapter 6 is to assess the production organization employed for the Mars 
Observer mission in light of the theoretical treatment. Before this assessment can be 
made, the applicability of the theory to the practice must be appropriately weighed. 
The analytical approach has characterized optimal incentive compatible direct 
revelation (I CDR) contracts. There is no a priori reason to believe that contracts 
employed in practice will be I CDR contracts. The credibility of this analytical technique 
as a tool to assess actual production organization rests in an appeal to the Revelation 
Principle and in the validity of the model chosen as a representation of reality. We rely 
on the Revelation Principle (see section 4.0, page 30) to assure that there exists a 
correspondence between every contract employed in practice and an ICDR analog. We 
rely on the Revelation Principle and the validity of the model employed to assure us that 
the optimal ICDR contract characterized under the structure of the model is the analog of 
an optimal production organization employed in practice. Granting the applicability of 
the Revelation Principle, we must justify the use of the R&D production models of 
Chapters 4 and 5 as proper models of Mars Observer subcomponent production before we 
may legitimately assess the production organization decisions of the Mars Observer 
Project Office. 
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As initially structured, each Mars Observer subcomponent contract included a 
mechanism for specifying the final price and performance level after the initial research 
phase was concluded. For the experiments this mechanism was the margin allocation 
process. The potential physical resource consequences of the margin process led to the 
need for a means of modifying the price and performance of the spacecraft; thus, the 
unilateral modification process. To justify that our modeling applies to Mars Observer 
production it is critical to specify whether these mechanisms could (or should) have been 
part of a complete contingent contract or were parts of an optimal incomplete contracting 
process. Re-phrased, were the initial Mars Observer subcomponent contracts designed 
subject to renegotiation (incomplete) or were they structured for contingent re-contracting 
of price and performance given the outcome of a first production phase? The resolution 
of this question is not obvious, for whereas the margin allocation and unilateral 
modification processes were included in the initial contracting plans neither is explicitly 
specified as a contingent contract and the degree of implicit specification is, naturally, a 
matter of debate. 
The models employed consider complete contracts over the two stage R&D 
production processes. The principal and agent agree to a specific Research investment, "A, 
and an explicit range of Development investments contingent on the outcome of the 
Research [p(T) for the profits seeking and t(T) for the performance seeking agent]. No 
renegotiation occurs, though the price and scope of the final product, S, are only known 
when the outcome of Research is announced. Optimal renegotiation between production 
stages has been theoretically justified by Tirole as a product of the principal not knowing 
his values ex ante for the probabilistic outcomes of agent investment during the first 
production stage- perhaps because of the impacts of other concurrent procurements.42 
Our analysis internalizes the impacts of concurrent subcomponent procurements under 
the proxy of residual funds, TI, jointly valued with the production outcome in question, S. 
42Jean Tirole, "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 2, 1986, 
pages 235-259. 
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In so doing we remove the need for an incomplete contract as the principal is ex ante 
aware of the tradeoffs between subcomponents that he will value even though he is not 
aware of the specific trades he will have to make. If the Mars Observer Project Office 
was initially aware of its potential tradeoffs among the various subcomponents, then it 
should have been possible and desirable to fashion complete R&D contracts. From this 
theoretical perspective, the margin allocation and unilateral modification re-contracting 
processes should have been elements of complete optimal contracts; thus, there must be 
complete ICDR analogs of each. 
Our approach to complete contracts specifically applies when all subcomponents 
to be purchased besides S are known commodities not undergoing R&D. However, in 
the Mars Observer experience, most of the subcomponents are demonstrably undergoing 
R&D production; thus, the applicability of our single R&D subcomponent model is a 
concern. We provide the following observations to mitigate this concern and rationalize 
the use of our model as a multiple R&D analysis tool for Mars Observer: 
If there are many subcomponents, all of which are contracted for via 
optimal ICDR contracts, then the mean outcome should be a reliable 
predictor. Thus, n can be thought of as a proxy for the mean outcome 
against which optimal tradeoffs with S are determined. 
The novel subcomponent impacts identified by our model come about 
from the positive tradeoffs between Sand TI; i.e. Usn> 0. If other 
subcomponents undergoing R&D were explicitly included and optimal 
contingent contracts determined for each, then the contracts would 
similarly be affected by cross partials between the subcomponents. 
Individual contracts under multi-subcomponent R&D production 
organization should be more complex yet have similar characteristics to 
the single component case. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions which determine and characterize 
each individual subcomponent contract would be dominated by the 
incentive compatibility constraints for the particular agent being 
contracted. Thus, each individual R&D contract might be very similar to 
the single subcomponent contracts modeled here. 
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A final concern over the applicability of our theory to Mars Observer rests on the 
juxtaposition of bilateral monopoly arrangements in practice with maximization relative 
to the principal's values in theory. The lack of transferable utility renders the standard 
approach of maximization of total surplus inappropriate. Some arbitrary weighting of 
returns between principal and agent would only complicate analysis without aiding in 
distinguishing the effects of profit from performance seeking agency which this research 
finds key and novel. Further, any ex ante arbitrary weighting of returns would remain 
subject to a post-Research, pre-Development participation constraint issue (the 'Hold-Up' 
problem). Therefore, we rely on an acceptably high reservation wage, K, negotiated 
before the contract to account for all ex ante bilateral monopoly concerns. 
For simplicity, the theoretical treatment did not include any interim participation 
constraints. Inclusion of such constraints would have complicated the analysis without 
substantively adding to the distinction between profit and performance seeking agency. 
The analysis implicitly assumes two means of persuading the agents to participate in the 
Development stage: the performance seeking agent's desire to participate until 
performance is attained and the profit seeking agent's desire not to loose his Research 
investment (recall that the profit seeker is reimbursed after final delivery). 
6.1 Characterization of the Original Bilateral Monopoly Contracts 
If the initial subcomponent R&D contracts for Mars Observer were intended as 
complete contracts and we wish to assess their optimality, we must characterize them in a 
manner that affords comparison to the optimal ICDR analog to the optimal real contract. 
To do this the margin allocation and unilateral modification re-contracting processes must 
be accounted for along with clear identification of whether the contract relies on final 
performance (S) or the outcome of Research (T) for the final price/performance decision. 
As initially contracted, the spacecraft was to be produced in accordance with the 
design and fabrication practices of the contractor without oversight from the Project 
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Office other than coordination assistance with the experiments; therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the outcome of spacecraft Research was not observable. By Theorem 4.3, 
an optimal ICDR R&D contract with a profit seeking agent and without an observable 
Research outcome must be based on the final outcome of production. The initial contract 
included a fixed price and a performance award that varied in the performance attained. 
Unilateral modifications were requests to trade Figure 6.1: Initial Spacecraft Contract 
price for performance relative to a technical 
tradeoff resulting from the prior Research 
investment. By Theorem 4.3, optimal Research 
investment would have to be enticed relative to 
final performance. Thus, Figure 6.1 
incorporates the unilateral modification process 




Price, t {S0 l 
Price 
Paid at end of mission 
Margin management implies a negative relationship between the outcome of 
Research, T, and Development funding, t(T), but in a manner such that each higher T and 
lower t(T) pair results in greater fmal performance, S[T, t(T)]. Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
general characteristics of such a contract in a manner appropriate for ICDR complete 
contracting. Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 state that optimal ICDR R&D contracts with 
performance seeking agents can be based on the outcome of Research whether the 
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Research Outcome, T 
Note, increases in t(T) result 
in decreases to S, however, 
each increase in T results in 
an increase to S [this is 
assured by Lemma 5.5) 




Development Funding, t(T) 
In addition to Research Funding, b 
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outcome is observable or not and that Development funding may be decreasing in the 
outcome of Research. The appropriateness of Figure 6.2 to the actual experiment 
contracting process rests on whether the functionality required for a complete contract 
was implicit between the Project Office and each experiment agent, for no explicit 
functionality existed in any of the initial agreements. 
6.2 Impacts of Different Experiment Agent Types 
The description of the Mars Observer experience has proceeded under the 
presumption that there existed a motivational difference between the experiment agents 
that were planetary scientists and those that were institutional representatives of a JPL 
Division or NASA Center. Both types of Agent are assumed to be motivated by the 
performance capability of their experiments; however, the JPL or NASA agent is 
assumed to have a greater relative motive to employ funds toward non-performance ends. 
When the outcome of Research is observable and the final outcome of their 
experiment enforceable by the principal, the only possible effect on production from 
performance motivated agents with different non-performance motives is through the 
agents' investment in Research (/.. in Chapter 5) and the principal's decision on allocating 
Research funding (b in Chapter 5). An agent more motivated by the non-performance use 
of funding will allocate more of the Research funding to these other uses, and, therefore, 
proportionately less to Research investment than will an agent more motivated by 
performance (e.g., b-/.. will be greater for a NASA agent than for a Scientist agent). 
6.3 The Lack of Observables in Experiment Subcomponent Production 
Recall from Chapter 2 that no engineering models or breadboards were approved 
for any of the instruments. Thus, the Research on the novel techniques and processes 
employed for each instrument would have to be conducted in conjunction with the design 
and construction of the production unit. The effect of such a blurred Research and 
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Development process on the presence, timing, and meaning of observables is significant 
The margin contract relies on reports of progress to determine insurance allocations from 
the margin fund pool. An observable that is dependably correlated with expected 
performance is an appropriate means of managing such contracts -- the observable 
becomes the progress report. The absence of a clear observable introduces the need to 
ask the agent for a progress report which the principal cannot verify independently. 
Granting that each of the initial experiment agents had some fundamental interest in the 
performance of his instrument, the model of Chapter 5 applies and the discussion of 
Section 5.3 on the role of the observable is pertinent The optimal ICDR contract must 
include the truthful revelation of the Research outcome by the agent This non-
observability requirement will tend to make the slope of the contract steeper. 
6.4 The Potential Lack of Enforcement in Experiment Subcomponent Production 
Two of the possible types of instrument agents 'out rank' the Project Office: A 
JPL Divisional Agent and a NASA Center Agent 43 The authority of the Project Office 
over these two types of agents may not be substantial. This diminution of authority raises 
the possibility that the Project Office could not credibly threaten to punish the agent 
should the outcome of Development be an experiment less capable than that which would 
result given the outcome of Research and the Development funding provided to the agent 
by the Project Office. As with the diversion of Research funding into non-Research uses, 
an agent not subject to enforcement may divert Development funding into non-
Development uses. Therefore contracting with such agents must account for whether the 
Project Office is capable of enforcing the outcome of Development. Initially granting the 
same margin contacts to Scientist agents and non-enforceable NASA and JPL agents 
decreases the likelihood that the initial contracting was optimal. 
43see Figure 2.2, page 5. 
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6.5 Renegotiation as a Response to Agency Problems 
If subcomponent production is optimally organized via complete contracts, then 
incidences of renegotiation imply a recognition of sub-optimal initial production 
organization. For Mars Observer, subcomponent renegotiation took the form of a change 
in agent (either through elimination or replacement), a change in the observability of the 
Research outcome, a change in the enforceability of the final outcome, and/or a change of 
contract form. Table 6.1 illustrates these changes. Analyses of the reasons for and 
outcomes of contract renegotiation indicates whether the Project Office recognized sub-
optimal initial contracting and whether such recognition was accompanied by a change 





Table 6.1: Contract Renegotiation 
JPLDiv. No No 
NASA No No 





JPL Divisional Agent: Mapping Spectrometry Renegotiation 
Any observability and enforcement problems surrounding the Mapping 
Spectrometry contract were dealt with in a summary fashion when the experiment was 
eliminated from the mission. There is no post-renegotiation evidence to corroborate the 
suggestion that the initial contract poorly accounted for JPL Divisional agency problems 
resulting from the lack of observables and enforcement. Thus, though wonderfully 
absolute, the motives for this renegotiation are ambiguous. 
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JPL Divisional Agent: Atmospheric Sounding Renegotiation 
The atmospheric sounding experiment was the other experiment initially 
contracted to a JPL Division. As described in Chapter 2, there is substantial evidence that 
the Project Office believed that the margin allocations to this instrument were excessive 
and the Project Office had difficulty obtaining the authority to redirect the effort. 
Eventually, the resource drain from the Project to the JPL Divisional Agent was so severe 
that the instrument was 'projectized' -- authority over its development was transferred 
from the JPL Division to the Project Office. This could be seen as a move to establish 
credible enforcement and to enhance observability. However, the renegotiation had been 
delayed far too long by JPL authorities above the Project Office to save much. Thus, it 
was perhaps more a punishment than an act designed to attain some vestige of optimal 
subcomponent production. 
NASA Center Agent: Gamma Ray Spectrometry Renegotiation 
The Project Office was seriously concerned with the responsiveness and 
accountability of the management of the gamma ray spectrometry experiment at NASA's 
Goddard Space Flight Center. After substantial margin allocations, and much 
complaining by the Project Office, management authority at Goddard for this experiment 
was transferred to a different subsection. Enforceability could not have been affected by 
this internal Goddard change as the agent still 'out-ranked' the Project Office and there 
was no tangible increase to observability. The only positive result of this renegotiation 
was a possible shift in agent motivation away from non-performance uses of funding 
toward performance uses. Thus, the Project Office would know that less of the funding 
provided would be wasted but it would not know what level of performance it was 
purchasing until the instrument was delivered and operational. 
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NASA Center Agent: Altimetry 
The initial altimetry experiment, a radar altimeter, was eliminated due to 
escalating price and physical resource estimates. Unlike the mapping spectrometry 
experiment, altimetry was not dropped from the mission - a different altimeter was 
selected. The laser altimetry experiment was still under the authority of Goddard; 
however, the contracting arrangement was altered. Rather 
than retaining the standard margin approach, a 
discontinuous contract was employed, illustrated by figure 
6.3. Over a broad range of expected performance, the 
contract was fixed price. If any observable indicated 
expected performance below a contractually pre-
determined level, the effort would be terminated. 
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This renegotiation did not alter the hierarchical conditions that had led to the lack 
of Project Office enforcement. However, the use of a fixed price contract, combined with 
the retention of an Agent with some fundamental interest in altimeter capability, can be 
seen as an attempt to obviate both observability and enforcement concerns. When asked 
to reveal a credible example of Research progress, the Agent would have no incentive to 
present something below the minimum acceptable if progress above minimum had been 
attained. Further, no incentive was present to misrepresent performance above the 
minimum acceptable level. 
Instrument Renegotiation and Observability 
Given Research outcomes that are observable by the Principal, and Development 
outcomes that are enforceable by the Principal, the analysis of Chapter 5 suggests that 
optimal, incentive compatible experiment contracting is readily attainable with 
experiment agents who are motivated by the performance capabilities of their 
experiments. However, if the outcomes of Research can be concealed from the principal, 
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the agent may wish to misrepresent its Research outcome in order to obtain additional 
funding that it may use for non-performance desires. The agent can do this if the funding 
received from the principal in response to the misrepresented Research outcome is 
sufficient to deliver the level of experiment capability attendant to the funding received. 
The potential misrepresentation of the Research outcome will be termed an interim 
adverse selection issue, that, if injected into the Principal's production organization 
problem, can seriously affect the potential of optimal, incentive compatible R&D 
contracts. 
Based on the analysis leading to equation (5.38) in Section 5.3, different 
performance seeking experiment agent types will reveal or conceal their Research 
outcome depending on the sensitivity of their Development funding contract [t(T) in 
Figure 6.2] to the Research outcome. We know from Lemma 5.5, that the Development 
contract will assuredly provide for more performance with each increasing revelation of 
the Research outcome; thus, the agent will obtain utility from revealing the true outcome. 
However, if the Research outcome is not observable, the agent will forgo utility from 
other uses of Development funding if it reveals the true outcome. Thus the result in 
equation (5.38) is intuitive and can be restated as: 
If the incremental change in Development funding at the particular 
Research outcome exceeds a relationship that is increasing in the ratio of 
the Agent's marginal dis utility of revelation to its marginal utility of 
revelation, then the agent will reveal the Research outcome. 
The distinction among the experiment agents is their valuation of non-R&D uses of 
funding; thus, under the same contract and outcome, some agents may reveal the true 
outcome of Research and some may not, with NASA Center and JPL Divisional agents 
more likely to misrepresent then Scientist agents. 
As noted, Mars Observer experiment production lacked clear observables. If the 
Project Office encountered problems due to interim adverse selection resulting from the 
lack of observables, then an expected response (assuming the Project Office sensed the 
cause of the problem) would be to generally increase the slope of the Development 
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contract for that experiment through project initiated renegotiation. To give the agent an 
incentive to respond to the new contract, it is reasonable to assume that the contract 
would require an increase in the average level of funding. [Referring to Figure 6.2, the 
suggested re-contracting for the same range of performance outcomes would be to 
increase the slope and also to raise the general level of t(T).] 
Enforceability concerns were effectively dealt with in the re-contracting of the 
Altimetry and Atmospheric Sounding experiments. Observability, however, remained a 
concern; thus, interim adverse selection concerns were pertinent. Altimetry renegotiation 
represents a dramatic increasing of the Development contract slope relative to the initial 
Altimetry contract; however, as both price and performance expectations were lowered 
by replacing a complex and highly capable radar-based design with a laser-based design 
it is difficult to perceive Project Office reaction to interim adverse selection concerns. 
Atmospheric sounding renegotiation offers clearer indications of the Project Office 
responding to interim adverse selection concerns. The minimum acceptable level of 
performance was reduced, the acknowledged price raised, and the access to margins 
reduced (the slope increased by making it less negative). 
The renegotiation of the Gamma Ray Spectrometry experiment did not secure 
enforceability as the experiment remained under the control of a NASA Center. If there-
contracting had secured observability, then the agent's non-performance use of 
Development funding would be discernible, and, thus, a margin development contract 
could have been used. However, if observability were not secured, then the Gamma Ray 
Spectrometry Agent was free to claim as large a margin allocation as he inferred he could 
without having to claim a Research outcome so low as to risk termination of the 
experiment. 
The two Scientist Agent experiments, Thermal Emission Spectrometry and 
Imaging did not undergo any substantial renegotiation as characterized in Table 6.1 . An 
attempt was made to fund an Engineering Model for the Thermal Emission Spectrometry 
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experiment; however, the Project Office opted not to fund this potential observable. 
These actions are not inconsistent with the statement that the Project Office considered 
there to be no serious sub-optimality problems with the Scientist Agent subcomponents. 
Repercussions of Experiment Contracting on Spacecraft Contracting 
Any experiment margin contracting approach, whether optimal or not, faces the 
prospect of impacting spacecraft production as the increased physical resource 
requirements attendant to margin allocations are demanded from the spacecraft. Once 
spacecraft Research had concluded and the technology level was established, producing 
more physical resources is a matter of allocating more money to Development. In the 
case of the Mars Observer spacecraft contract, the Unilateral Modification was the 
mechanism used to organize the Development production of increased instrument 
resources. An assessment of this process with reference to the analysis of Chapter 4 is 
enlightening. 
When the Project Office contracted for a spacecraft for the Mars Observer 
mission, the product desired was dependable experiment resource services for at least two 
years in Mars orbit. The specific amount of resources was not knowable at the start given 
the uncertain needs of the instruments. Thus, the price/performance technological 
capability of the spacecraft was a significant issue subject to optimal R&D subcomponent 
contracting. This technology level would not be observable to the Project Office due to 
the nature of the product being procured: the extent of design studies and tests, the 
fabrication processes, the quality of labor, and many other inputs to production critical for 
reliability (expected performance at Mars) are not readily observable. However, it is in 
the interest of the Project Office that the Agent pursue technological improvements 
compatible with Project Office interest in expected performance. By Theorem 4.3 this 
can only be done with an incentive compatible R&D subcomponent contract based on the 
performance outcome of Development (as in Section 4.2). The contract illustrated in 
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Figure 6.1 has the positively monotonic property which, by the analysis of section 4.2, 
could have represented a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimum contract 
between the Project Office and the spacecraft contractor. It is not obvious or perhaps 
even knowable whether the initial contract was sufficiently steep. However, the likely 
effect of re~ontracting via the Unilateral Modification process can be posited relative to 
this condition. 
When the Project Office requested an increase in experiment resources via a 
unilateral modification, it was requesting a trade of price incurred for performance 
received relative to a production possibilities frontier based on the technology outcome of 
spacecraft Research. Regardless of the questionable mechanism employed to arrive at a 
price for the modification, the salient optimal incentive compatibility issue is that the 
price of the requested increase to the R&D efforts was added to the fixed price segment 
of the contract, not to the performance award. In practice, the performance award was the 
truly fixed aspect of the contract with the initial 'fixed' price varying with the requested 
performance increases. This type of contract does not correspond to the ICDR contract 
illustrated in Figure 6.1 and bears no resemblance to a contract that would have enticed 
optimal Research investment. 
The historical evidence suggests that the Project Office had become concerned 
that the spacecraft technological investment had been insufficient The Project Office 
renegotiated the spacecraft contract by internalizing many of the reliability oriented 
functions and increasing monitoring of the spacecraft agent by insisting that JPL practices 
be used under JPL supervision. At no time, however, did the Project Office increase the 
performance award instead of internalizing functions. 
6.6 Appropriate Production Organization for Different Circumstances 
What follows are synopses of the types of R&D contacts that can reasonably be 
justified under different agent and information environment circumstances. These 
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synopses are drawn from the Mars Observer pathology, the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5, 
and the preceding sections of Chapter 6. Table 6.2 accompanies the discussion as a 
summation. 
Pure Profit Seeking Agent 
I. Never employ a pure fixed price R&D contract, the agent will merely claim a very 
bad Research outcome and produce at the 'off-the-shelf technology level [see section 
4.2, the Caveat for contracting Case A]. 
II. If the outcome of Research is observable, then Section 4.4 suggests that, although a 
wide range of contacts may be possible, contracts that are strictly positive in the 
observable are certainly appropriate. A Fixed Price Performance A ward contract 
based on the outcome of Research can be the analog of an optimal ICDR R&D 
contract for these circumstances. 
III. If the outcome of Research is not observable, then Theorem 4.3 states that the 
contract must depend on the fmal outcome of R&D production rather than on a 
reported interim outcome. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, the Fixed Price Performance 
Award contract can be the analog of an optimal ICDR R&D contract for these 
circumstances. 
IV. If the outcome of Development is not enforceable, then do not contract with a pure 
profit seeking agent. 
Performance Seeking Agent 
I. If the outcome of Research is observable, then employ the performance seeking 
agent most interested in performance and least interested in other uses of funding 
(e.g., low \P'/v'St). For these characteristics, some form of partial margin contract 
may well be the analog of an optimal ICDR contract.44 
II. If the outcome of Research is not observable, then the conclusion is the same as in 
(1). By Theorem 5.6 contracting without an observable outcome of Research may be 
critically affected by the particular performance seeking agent in question. The 
optimal ICDR contract may need to be steeper (more positive, less negative) in the 
stated Research outcome than for the observable case. 
44 An agent with greater interest in other uses of funding may nonetheless be the best choice if the 
agent uniquely possesses fixed assets that would lower the required Research investment, A,. This is a 
possible justification for contracting a NASA Center or JPL Division rather than a Scientist agent; however, 
the comparative contracting decision must consider the costly effects of non-enforceability. 
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III. If the outcome of Research is observable but the outcome of Development is not 
enforceable, then the conclusion is the same as in (D. In this case, the agent will 
utilize a calculable part of his Development funding in non-performance pursuits. 
IV. If the outcome of Development is not enforceable and the outcome of Research not 
observable, then the optimization problem cannot result in a contract that varies in 
the stated outcome of Research; thus, a fixed price contract, such as the renegotiated 
altimetry contract, is the optimal ICDR R&D contract. 
Table 6.2: Actual Contracts that may Correspond to Optimal ICDR R&D Contracts 
Agent Production and Authority Characteristics 
Type Observable and Non-Observable Observable and Non-Observable and 
Enforceable and Enforceable Non-Enforceable Non-Enforceable 
Fixed Price/ Fixed Price/ 
Profit Performance Performance Do not Do not 
Seeking Award based A ward based on Contract Contract 
on the Research the Development 
Outcome Outcome 
Performance Margin Contract Margin Contract Margin Contract Fixed 
Seeking based on the based on the stated based on the Price Research Outcome Research Outcome* Research Outcome*~ 
* By the analysis of Section 5.3 that leads to Theorem 5.6, such a margin contact may be steeper than when 
the outcome of Research is observable. 
** The optimal contract in this case must be determined under the realization that some of the Development 
funding will be used for non-performance purposes. The suggestion that this contract is optimal is based on 
an extension ofthe analysis contained in Chapters 2-6, this case is not dealt with in the theory nor does it 
arise in the Mars Observer history. 
6. 7 Sumll'laQ' 
There is no evidence that the Project Office initially contracted or renegotiated 
with a clear recognition of agency effects on the potential of organizing Mars Observer 
subcomponent production optimally. In particular, non-enforceable margin R&D 
contracts to four NASA Center and JPL Division agents plus the completely backward 
incentives of the spacecraft unilateral modification process are demonstrably non-optimal 
approaches to R&D production organization. The numerous acts of renegotiation suggest 
that the Project office recognized that there were problems with the initial set of 
contracts. However, recognition that a problem exists does not imply realization of the 
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root cause or optimal cure. The altimetry and atmospheric sounding experiments appear 
to have been renegotiated in the direction of optimality; however, the gamma ray 
spectrometry and spacecraft renegotiations did not move toward optimality. The Mars 
Observer production organization was sub-optimal due to neglect of agency issues, 
primarily moral hazard. 
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Chapter 7: Examples of Various R&D Production Organizations 
7.0 The Cassini Resource Management Plan 
The Cassini mission to Saturn is currently undertaking a similar R&D process to 
that of Mars Observer. Initiated in 1986, the project has experienced several major 
programmatic changes after many major subcomponent suppliers were selected; thus, 
conditions of bilateral monopoly exist between the Cassini Project Office and its agents. 
Among the thirteen major Cassini subcomponent suppliers, seven are JPL 
Divisional or NASA Center agents, three are foreign funded, three are scientists at 
American universities, and none is purely profit seeking.45 Given that the preponderance 
of agents 'out rank' the Project Office (or, in the case of the foreign agents, are not bound 
to the Project Office for funding), substantial enforcement problems pertain. 
Additionally, the long transit (seven years, arriving at Saturn in 2004) so delays the time 
when enforcement would occur that the threat of enforcement may not be significant 
Further complicating production organization, subcomponent production is distributed 
widely, making the tenuous goal of observability all the more tenuous. 
Optimal R&D subcontracting to performance seeking agents with neither credible 
enforcement nor observability of the Research outcome is limited to fixed price 
contracts.46 Interestingly, in 1991 the Cassini Project Office adopted a resource 
management plan in which each of the thirteen agents was given fixed allocations of 
funding and physical resources. Each agent is to pursue the best performance/resource 
tradeoff that they can. Taking advantage of the multi-input performance production 
functions, the agents are allowed to barter funding and physical resources among 
themselves. The Project Office will not augment the total endowments of funding and 
45The spacecraft and six of the experiments are contracted to JPL Divisional or NASA Center Agents, 
three experiments (one a Titan probe) are contracted to foreign Agents, and three of the experiments are 
contracted to scientist Agents from American universities. 
46see section 6.6. 
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physical resources to the group of agents such as is the case under margin management. 
In essence, a multi-member, multi-dimensional, and multi-period Edgeworth box 
endowment economy has been initiated. Thus, the organization of subcomponent 
production chosen by the Cassini Managing Principal appears consistent with the 
recommendations of optimal R&D theory. 
7.1 The Procurement of Booster Engines for Commercial Satellite Services 
The commercial procurement of satellite services involves an authority hierarchy 
from Ultimate Principal to Subcomponent Agents that is similar to the hierarchy for the 
procurement of a planetary science mission. Figure 7.1 illustrates an example authority 
hierarchy for satellite services that existed before the Challenger Shuttle disaster. 
Procurement along one possible Managing Principal path is shown. Over time, each 
subcomponent procurement could be subject to R&D. Prior to Challenger, the choice of 
subcomponent suppliers was constrained by the Boland Amendment which mandated a 
Shuttle monopoly for American launch services. As such, contractual terms for Launch 
vehicle and facility services were dictated to the Managing Principal; thus, examination 
of the subcomponent 'contracts' may not be particularly relevant to a general assessment 
of R&D contracting. 
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Examination of subcomJX>nent procurement may, however, be relevant to a 
general assessment of R&D procurement after Challenger. With the Shuttle fleet 
grounded, high costs and low reliability exJX>sed, and a backlog of satellites awaiting 
launch, a number of commercial launch vehicle companies were formed. Figure 7.2 
illustrates the changes to the satellite services procurement hierarchy JX>St-Challenger 
with the addition of a secondary tier of subcomJX>nent suppliers beneath the launch 
vehicle supplier. A particular launch vehicle supplier, General Dynamics, is noted. 
General Dynamics was one of several firms wishing to capitalize on the commercial 
launch service opJX>rtunity by restarting production of a pre-Shuttle launch vehicle, the 
Atlas booster. No Atlas hardware had been manufactured for over 20 years; thus, 
updating Atlas subcomJX>nents (R&D) would be a pertinent concern for General 
Dynamics. The booster engine production contract is highlighted as it involved R&D. 
Figure 7.2: Post-Challenger Procurement of Satellite Services 
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Given that General Dynamics was committed to restarting Atlas production, there 
was only one realistic choice of engine manufacturer, the Rocketdyne division of 
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Rockwell International, which was the past manufacturer of Atlas engines. General 
Dynamics and Rocketdyne entered into a contact for 60 Atlas engine sets at a price of 
approximately $600 million. The entire price is not paid to Rocketdyne 'up-front'. 
Instead, Rocketdyne receives a payment for each engine set delivered. Should 
Rocketdyne's engines prove unreliable, Rocketdyne may never be able to deliver all 60 
engines either due to lack of customers for Atlas launch or due to General Dynamics 
termination of the Rocketdyne contact with an accompanying suit for reliance damages. 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the essentials of this monopoly, R&D contract between a profit 
seeking agent and a Principal who values a balance of performance from numerous 
subcomponents. Due to the reliability arguments, there should be a direct relationship 
between the degree of valued technological innovation claimed by Rocketdyne and the 
proportion of the 60 contracted engine sets that are delivered and perform adequately. 
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The Atlas engine contract specifies a number of upgrades to the old engines. 
Beyond simple performance improvements (thrust, efficiency, mass), numerous 
production process improvements meant to insure reliable performance are specified. 
Whereas raw measures of performance may be observable each flight, myriad production 
processes may not be observable; further, their impact on reliable performance may not 
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be discernible until after many launches. General Dynamic's decisions regarding 
production of the other launch vehicle subcomponents and appropriate insurance 
coverage would have benefited substantially from knowledge of the true extent of the 
engine improvements. Thus, it is not surprising that the contract includes technological 
innovations by Rocketdyne to the Atlas engine even though many of these innovations 
were not directly observable to General Dynamics. 
The lack of observability over the outcome of Research performed by a profit 
seeking agent implies, by Theorem 4.3, that the optimal R&D contact may only be 
conditioned on the outcome of Development (the case of section 4.2). Thus, the Atlas 
engine contract should either be based on the observed performance of each engine 
[which Figure 7.3 surly does] or somehow utilize the repeated game nature of multi-unit 
production to make the outcome of Research effectively observable. An argument can be 
posed that the true outcome of Research can be estimated accurately over the observed 
unit-to-unit performance as the number of units launched increases. This should result in 
a credible threat deterring Rocketdyne from misrepresenting the outcome of Research too 
severely. Rocketdyne's misrepresentation calculus would surely be affected by the 
potential unit-to-unit profit represented by each engine use. Thus, it can be supposed that 
a contract such as that illustrated in Figure 7.3 can be 'steep enough' over N-sufficiently 
large units that the agent will truthfully reveal the outcome of Research. 
7.2 Procurement of the Mars Environmental Survey: A Suggested Approach 
The Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR) is currently under consideration as the 
American planetary science mission to Mars after Mars Observer. MESUR is to consist 
of several landed craft conducting uniform measurements at numerous points on the 
Martian surface. The landed packages consist of two major subcomponents: a craft that 
provides transit, landing, communication, and power services; and an instrumentation set 
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designed to make the required measurements. Clearly there is a connection between the 
two subcomponents since the instrumentation set cannot require larger mass, power, and 
communication resources than the craft is capable of providing. 
What follows is a proposal for procuring the MESUR mission in a manner 
corresponding to the general framework and recommendations of our analysis. 47 Figure 
7.4 illustrates a suggested production hierarchy for MESUR Unlike prior hierarchies 
examined in this research, a competitive selection process is present; namely, the 
selection of the private finn providing the craft subcomponent. 















Craft Subcomponent -- Agency Concerns/Solutions 
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the major agency concerns associated with 
procurement of the craft subcomponent of the MESUR mission and the suggested 
contractual solutions for each. Note that both initial and interim adverse selection 
47Charles Polk, Incentive Contracting for the MESUR Mission: Pathfinder and Network, JPL Briefing 
to the MESUR Advisory Panel, April4, 1992. 
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concerns are dealt with due to the opportunity to solicit competition among prospective 
agents. In the next two subsections, the complete contractual process will be described 
followed by an explanation of the properties projected to solve the agency concerns. 
Table 7.1: Craft Agency Concerns and Solutions 
Agency Concern 
Selection of the agent most capable of 
undertaking an R&D production process that 
results in a mix of performance and price in 
accordance with Project Office values. 
Moral Hazard concern that the outcome of 
Research will not truthfully indicate the 
investment in Research. 
Interim Adverse Selection concern that the 
outcome of Research wilJ not be observed 
and may not be truthfully reported. 
Contractual Solution 
Auction process where bids are two 
dimensional: price and performance. 
The two top bidders are granted the 
right to participate in a 'Fly-Off. 
Per Chapter 4, the overall contract 
will be positive in the outcome of 
Research. 
The likelihood of winning the 'fly-off and 
expected profits depend on an observable 
directly related to the Research outcome. 
Craft Subcomponent-- Use of a 'Fly-Off to Select Agent 
Let N = the number of craft to be built and set to Mars and refer to the envelope of 
physical resources available to the instrumentation set as E. Before any selection 
information is requested from the prospective Craft Agents, the Project Office announces 
the following selection process: 
1. The target E and N desired by the Project Office 
u. Selection of two prospective Agents in accordance with an auction based on 
the bid matrix of Figure 7.5. All prospective agents may bid among the 21 
allowable combinations of Craft unit price and unit warranty. Figure 7.5 is 
configured to represent the valuations of the Project Office favoring balance 
between price and expected performance. The auction is an open English 
auction. Once bid, a cell cannot be bid by another participant. Participants 
may bid more than one cell. The two prospective Craft Agents who bid the 
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two highest ranked cells will be 
granted the right to participate in a 
'fly-off', in which each of the two 
will build, launch, land and operate 
one craft. The winner of the 'fly-off 
will receive the contract for all N 
craft. If fewer than three bidders 
participate, the Project Office 
iterates the auction with different 
combination of E, N, unit prices, and 
warranties. 
iii. Before the fly-off launch, each of the 
two actual instrument set resource 
envelopes, Ea, is observed. 
Prospective final unit prices, Pt, are 
now known due to a relationship 
specified by the Project Office pre-
auction that is exemplified by Figure 
7.6 [by Figure 7.5, prospective 
warranties are also specified]. 
Figure 7.5: Craft Auction Matrix 
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tv. Assuming that each 'fly-off craft operates for two months on the Martian 
surface, then the winner will be the craft Agent with the highest & up to 
(1 +a)E, with a tie breaker on the 
size of the warranty. 
v. If one craft fails to operate for two 
months, the other Agent wins. 
vi. If neither craft operates for two 
months, revert to (iv) 
vii The production contract form to 
be awarded to the fly-off winner 
is specified pre-auction and is 
exemplified by Figure 7.7. 
Figure 7.7: MESUR Craft Contract 
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Craft Subcomponent -- Disposition of Agency 
Concerns by Contracting Process 
Define the outcome of Research to be technology measured by its effect on the 
ability of the principal to convert funds into expected Ea, where expected Ea is the 
likelihood that Ea will last for the contractual duration of the mission and result in a 
payment of Pf to the agent An increase in Ea that is due to a good Research outcome will 
decrease exposure to warranty claims and increase revenue due to its effect on Pf, 
whereas, an increase in Ea that is due to an input of more production funding but no better 
Research outcome will decrease profits. Therefore, the agent with the better Research 
outcome has an incentive to produce a proportionately higher Ea. Further, expected 
profits include the probability that an Agent is selected. The higher is Ea, the greater is 
the chance of winning both directly and because of the increase to the warranty tie 
breaker (see selection rule ivabove). Thus, the higher is T, the greater profit can be 
attained from increasing Ea.. Therefore, Ea is an unambiguous signal of T -- The higher is 
Ea, the more successful was the Agent's R&D outcome. 
Competition to win the Fly-Off will alleviate the principal's concern over the 
truthful revelation of Ea and the Research outcome; thus, eliminating the interim adverse 
selection concern that, by Theorem 4.3, would otherwise render an optimal R&D contract 
based on T impossible. The contract represented in Figure 7.7 provides for expected net 
revenues to be positively increasing for all Research outcomes; fulfilling the sufficient 
condition for an optimum to the agent's incentive compatibility problem. Therefore, the 
moral hazard concern over revealing truthful information regarding Research investment 
is alleviated. Our theory has not considered initial adverse selection among several 
agents, a concern which should be considered in suggesting that a procurement approach 
is optimal. In our suggested MESUR procurement approach, we posit that the initial 
adverse selection concern can be alleviated through the competition of an English 
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Auction which results in two 'winners' who go on to compete in the Fly-Off. Assuming 
that the initial bidders vary in their abilities to conduct the R&D production appropriate 
for MESUR and that the bidders have consistent priors over industry capabilities, then it 
is surely plausible that the proposed auction will result in the selection of the two Fly-Off 
contenders with the best comparative advantages relative to the principal's valuation of 
price and performance. 
Production Organization of Instrument Set Subcomponent 
As before, we assume that the Managing Principal, the MESUR Project Office, 
values a balance of mission performance and mission price. The contracting structure 
proposed for the craft subcomponent does not contradict this assumption in that increases 
in Pf are expected to result in increases in the quantity and quality (reliability) of Ea. 
However, &tis not the performance that the Project Office values; rather, &tis an input to 
the instrument set subcomponent production process that is intended to produce the 
Science measurement performance valued by the Project Office. 
Depending on the types of experiment agents, nature of observability, and 
presence or lack of enforcement, the Project Office might optimally organize production 
of the instrument set subcomponent in any of the ways outlined in Section 6.6. Any 
contracting arrangement must include the reservation that no more physical resources can 
be used than can be accommodated by Ea. Thus, an optimal margin contacting 
arrangement with several scientist agents may well fix the physical resources that can be 
used yet vary the funding in negative proportion to the outcomes of each agent's 
Research. 
In addition to the potential optimality of a margin or insurance type production 
organization for each element in the instrument set subcomponent, there is the potential 
optimality of an externally induced margin organization for the whole instrument set 
subcomponent. The instrument production functions can be assumed to be positively 
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influenced by both physical resources (Ea) and funds; thus, increases in Ea above E may 
cause the Project Office to allocate fewer funds to the whole instrument set 
subcomponent. This externally induced margin production organization might be 
incorporated into the instrument Agent contracts in an incentive compatible fashion if the 
individual instrument tradeoffs between physical resources and performance and/or 
funding are sufficient to result in greater performance and/or profit. 
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Chapter 8: The Placement of R&D Procurement in Production Organization 
The two fundamental issues dealt with in this thesis are the two fundamental 
issues of production: the division of labor and technological innovation. Technological 
innovation may be seen as entering production through the labor most adept at such 
innovation; or an entity adept at an innovation may be seen as self-selecting a place in 
production that maximizes its returns. Production is incremental and innovations enter 
production incrementally. The increments to production (subcomponents) are innovated 
by agents to the principal who purchases the final, assembled good. Some intermediate 
entity, the Managing Principal, will organize subcomponent production. In competition, 
the Managing Principal that best coordinates the motivations of the Ultimate Principal 
with the motivations of the subcomponent agents will succeed. Over time, this 
coordination must account for changes affecting the optimal organization of 
subcomponent R&D. 
It is completely reasonable that optimal institutional coordination between the 
Managing Principal and the Subcomponent Agent will vary from fmal good to final good, 
from subcomponent to subcomponent, and from incidence of innovation to incidence of 
innovation. It is implicit that agency concerns will affect whether subcomponent R&D is 
conducted within the institutional boundaries of the Managing Principal or between 
legally distinct institutions. All the same, agency concerns pertain. The agent of Chapter 
5, partially motivated by subcomponent performance, partially by other uses of funding, 
can be seen as representing either an agent internal to a Managing Principal's institution 
or an external agent with strong repeated game or post-game concerns. The agent of 
Chapter 4 is a classic one shot profit maximizer. As we have seen, optimal production 
organization is affected by which form of agency the Managing Principal selects. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the structure of production organization is not 
arbitrary and is affected, at least partially, by the qualities of R&D agency. An 
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examination of the three production examples given in the Introduction helps to clarify 
the foregoing. 
Automobile vs. Jet Aircraft Engines 
Automobile and Jet Aircraft engines require production techniques dissimilar 
to those of the final good, and are thus subject to innovations which may have no 
beneficial effect on production of the other subcomponents constituting the final 
good. Because the subcomponents are complex, the production organization of 
innovations should be strongly affected by agency concerns. As the source of 
motive force for both vehicles, innovations that decrease fuel costs or maintenance 
costs would have substantial worth to the Ultimate Principals in each case. 
The Ultimate Principal for airliner production is an airline, an entity procuring 
numerous units and desiring utility for at least twenty years. When purchasing an 
airliner, an airline selects which of several engine manufacturers will supply 
engines. This is not surprising since airlines maintain the engines in their fleets and 
have substantial investments in engine tooling and training that is often specific to 
the engine manufacturer. Given the airline's investment in aircraft and engine 
maintenance, innovations in jet engines are often incorporated into an airline's 
existing fleet by swapping out innovated engines for old engines. Given the nature 
and needs of the airlines, the aircraft manufacturers make engine 
removal/replacement uncomplicated and design a new aircraft in conjunction with 
the various engine manufacturers so that common interfaces are employed. 
The Ultimate Principal relative to automobile production is the car buyer, 
usually an entity procuring one unit of production and desiring non-commercial 
utility for five, or perhaps, ten years. The average car buyer will not be swapping 
out engines or even maintaining the engine in his car. The average car buyer will 
wish to be able to find service that is dependably expert in the technologies 
incorporated into his car engine; thus, there is reason for a car manufacturer to 
maintain substantial control over engine innovation and production. All the same, 
engine innovation is not completely internalized. Automobile manufacturers find 
value in sponsoring the auto racing industry, a specialized sliver of the automobile 
market populated by Managing Principals with an intense interest in innovation and 
substantial assets of funding and engine knowledge. These specialized Managing 
Principals can direct and assist the internal agents of the automobile manufactures 
who have been charged with engine innovation. 
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Suspension Design vs. Production 
Unlike automobile engines, higher performance suspension system innovation 
may be contracted outside of the automobile manufacturer yet production retained. 
Automobile manufacturers that specialize in high performance vehicles (e.g., 
Porsche, Mercedes, Lotus) tend to internally innovate suspension system design. 
General use automobile manufactures that wish to compete in the high performance 
market may opt to externally contract suspension system innovation. With 
reference to the analysis of this thesis, the price of internal agency (b-A) for the 
large general use manufacturer would seem to be higher than the external 
contracting costs of specialized suspension system innovation. This may be 
partially explained by the observation that Lotus is, in the language of this thesis, a 
performance seeking agent. For instance, as a manufacturer of vehicles at the 'high-
end' of the performance market, Lotus may consider an R&D contract with an 
automobile company whose performance vehicles are at the 'low-end' of the market 
as providing a subsidy for its own R&D. Lotus may find this subsidy arrangement 
sufficiently appealing, and the 'low-end' competition sufficiently non-threatening, 
that a long-term interest in maintaining the subsidy results in an incentive 
compatible relationship. 
Purchase of Subcomponent or Production Licenses 
The fundamental innovations behind the artificial sweetener NutraSweet and 
the compact disc data storage system are protected by patents, yet in the former case 
the patent holder is a subcomponent supplier whereas in the latter case the patent 
holder has sold licenses allowing competitors to internally produce its innovation. 
As a complex chemical compound, NutraSweet production requires substantial, yet 
easily scalable, investments in plant and equipment. As an ingredient in food, 
substantial market entry restrictions from the Food and Drug Administration deter 
entry of 'copy-cat' products. Compact disc technology suffered from no similar 
governmental restrictions on market entry, yet as a data storage technique its market 
worth was only secure if it could become an industry standard (recall Sony's 
experience with the Beta video recording innovation). With reference to the 
analysis of this thesis, the price of internal agency (b-A) for circumventing the 
NutraSweet patent is too high, whereas the effective cost of circumventing the 
compact disc patent was so low that the patent holders had the incentive to license 
the technology. 
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All of these examples are taken from the private production economy. The choice 
of production organization need not have been consciously made by the Managing 
Principals in each case -- market forces might just as well have lead production to such 
organizations. As a Managing Principal, IBM so dominated the supply of computing 
equipment to the purchasers of computing resources that the concentration of market 
power was akin to a monopoly. Over the last decade, innovations in hardware, software, 
and user awareness of the utility of computing have reshaped production organization, 
and market share structure, in the computer industry. With a radically shrunken market 
share and billions of dollars of operating losses, no one would accuse IBM of wielding 
monopolist power. At the same time, the production organizations that have proven to be 
more successful responses to (or stimulators of) innovation need not have been optimally 
divined by the Managing Principals that have outstripped 'Big Blue' (e.g., Apple and 
Compaq). Over time, market entry should accommodate optimal adaptation of 
production organization to subcomponent innovation. 
The same may not hold for Public Sector production organization. The Mars 
Observer experience, utilized in this thesis to point out the pitfalls of disregarding agency 
concerns in R&D subcomponent production organization, is an example of a type of 
production that may be considered a Public Monopoly. The production of planetary 
science knowledge in the United States has always been the protected domain of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of the U.S. 
government. Unlike the early days of manned exploration, government-to-government 
competition from the Soviet Union in planetary exploration was never strong or 
particularly credible. Where public procurement is desired and private provision is not 
tenable, the governmental Managing Principal must be aware of the agency implications 
of R&D subcomponent production organization if wasteful individual procurements and 
eventual bloated public institutions are to be avoided. 
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